HIGH CHIEF IKECHI EMENIKE  & 1ORS VS. ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS (APC) & 6ORS, JUDGEMENT DELIVERED BY  HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, JSC IN SC/CV/1252/2023

SC/CV/1252/2023

JUDGMENT
(Delivered by HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, JSC)

I have read in the draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Uwani Musa Abba Aji, JSC.It is a sister appeal to Appeal No: SC/CV/1250/2023.

 This appeal is against the judgment of the Court of Appeal sitting in Lagos delivered on 2nd December, 2023 in Appeal No: CA/OW/EP/GOV/AB/35/2023 between CHIEF IKECHI EMENIKE & ANOR v. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & 6 OTHERS which dismissed the Appeal of the Appellants. The Appellants before this court were Petitioners in Petition No: EPT/AB/GOV/02/2023: High Chief Ikechi Emenike & Anor v. Independent National Electoral Commission & 6 Others constituted by Coram: H.T.D Gwadah, Omotara Adeyemi and Boniface S. Ngyou, J J, who dismissed the Petition of the Petitioners, now Appellants, challenging the declaration and return of the 3rd Respondent ( Dr. Alex Otti) as elected Governor of Abia State.

The facts leading to this appeal are that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) (sued herein as the 1st Respondent), conducted an election for the office of Governor of the Abia State on the 18th day of March 2023. The 1st Appellant contested the election as the candidate of the 2nd Appellant, while the 3rd Respondent contested the election as the candidate of the 2nd Respondent. The 5th Respondent was the candidate of the 4th Respondent, while the 7th Respondent was the candidate of the 6th Respondent. There were 15 other contestants at the election, at the end of which the 1st Respondent declared the 3rd Respondent the duly elected candidate, having scored 175,467 and attained the majority of lawful votes cast at the election, as well as not less than one quarter (1/4) of the votes cast in each of at least two-third (2/3) of the Local Government Areas of Abia State. Dissatisfied with the declaration of return made by the 1st Respondent, the 1st Appellant who came 4th at the election with 24,091 votes, initiated this Petition against the 3rd Respondent, the 5th Respondent who came 2nd with 88,529 votes, and the 7th Respondent who came 3rd with 28,972 votes on the following grounds:

“(I) The 3rd, 5th, and 7th Respondents at the time of the election were not qualified to contest the election.”

“(Ii) The 3rd Respondent was not duly elected by the majority of the lawful votes cast at the election.”

At the hearing of the appeal, the Appellants’ Counsel Abubakar Malami, insisted that the issues in this appeal are unique, that the appeal is worthy of the consideration of the courts. My Lords, in the Appellants’ brief settled by the aforesaid counsel four (4) issues were distilled for determination as follows:

1. Was the lower court’s treatment of Appellants’ appeal on the threshold issue of competence that is, Locus Standi correct? ( Grounds 1 and 2 of the Notice of Appeal)
2. Did the Court of Appeal rightly endorse the trial tribunals finding that the first, sixth, and seventh Respondents did not abandon their pleadings by not calling evidence?( Ground 6 of the Notice of Appeal)
3. Did the Court court of Appeal rightly endorse the tribunal’s rejection of Exhibits P14 and P14A on the grounds that these Exhibits had been “dumped” on the trial tribunal? ( Ground 7 of the Notice of Appeal)
4. Was the Court of Appeal right to conclude that the Petitioners did not establish that the third, fifth, and seventh Respondents were not qualified to contest for the election of 18/3/2023 under the reference in this case? ( Grounds 3 to 5 and 8 to 17 of the Notice of Appeal)

The 1st Respondent’s Counsel in the brief settled by Dr. Nasiru Tijani, Esq., the 2nd Respondent’s brief settled by Dr. Onyechi Ikpeazu OON, SAN, the 3rd Respondent’s brief settled by Omosanya Popoola, Esq., the 4th & 5th Respondents’ joint brief settled by Udochi Iheanacho, Esq., the 6th Respondent’s brief settled by Chukwuemeka N. Nwigwe, Esq., more or less and in similar terms couched issues in tandem with the Appellants’ issues. I will give an opinion on the issues which determine this appeal. Succinctly put, the complaint of the Appellants are that their Petition in their words were “disemboweled by the trial Tribunal” and this was allowed by the court below.

The 3rd, 4th, and 5th Respondents had challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear Ground 1 of the Petition concerning the qualification of the 3rd, 5th, and 7th Respondents to contest the election. Senior Counsel complained that the Court of Appeal had erroneously held that the appeal against the striking out of the paragraphs had no utilitarian value. Mr Malami, SAN argued that the three rulings from the trial Court were certainly never cosmetic and anything said to the contrary was perverse because the rulings not only decided the petition was incompetent by reason of want of locus, certain fundamental paragraphs of the originating petition and the Petitioner’s reply to the various differences were also struck out. The subsequent consideration of the case on the merits did not and could never as a matter of law, erase the earlier adverse findings that the Petition was incompetent by way of lack of locus Standi, in the three rulings on this threshold issue of jurisdiction. The Appellants’ argued that the order of the court below striking out the Appellant’s appeals against the ruling of the trial Tribunal was perverse as the court below was bound by the law to determine the appeals. Counsel cited OSUJI v. ETEOCHA (2007) LPELR-2816 (SC) on perversity of a judgement.

All learned counsel for the Respondents in opposition argued in essence on this issue that the matters presented in Grounds 1 and 2 of the Notice of Appeal and Issue 1 of the Appellant’s Issue for the determination are essentially academic and will serve no utilitarian benefit in the just determination of this appeal. Dr. Ikpeazu went as far as to ask the rhetorical question and to answer same to the effect that what if the Supreme Court determines that the Court of Appeal in these austere period ought to have determined the four (4) appeals which arose from the same proceeding and held that the Tribunal was wrong to have struck out the said paragraphs of the Petition, ORLAND Council went as far as to ask the rhetorical question and to answer same to the effect that what if the Supreme Court determines that the Court of Appeal in this austere period ought to have determined the four appeals which arose from the same proceeding and held that the Tribunal was wrong to have struck out the said paragraphs of the petition, ORLAND Council went as far as to ask the rhetorical question and to answer same to the effect that what if the Supreme Court determines that the Court of Appeal in this austere period ought to have determined the four appeals which arose from the same proceeding and held that the Tribunal was wrong to have struck out the said paragraphs of the petition, would it not be for the Supreme Court to take those paragraphs into consideration in determining the merit of the allegations in the Petition?. At this stage of the proceeding, the Appellants ought not to have been considered by the Tribunal or the Court of Appeal in determining the merit of the Appellants’ case. Counsel argued the clear desire of the Court of Appeal to decide the essence of the case, a factor which was already facilitated by the fact the Tribunal rendered a comprehensive decision based on the totality of the pleading in the Petition. Learned Respondents’ Counsel cited ARDO v. INEC (2017) LPELR-41919 (SC), ODEDO v. INEC (2008) LPELR-2204 (SC), UGBA v. SUSWAN (2014) LPELR-22882 (SC).

OPINION

It is apt at this point to give a little background in respect of this appeal. The Appellants called three (3) witnesses. PW1 was listed in the list of witnesses, while the last two witnesses testified based on subpoena issued by the tribunal. Following objections to the application for the use of their witness statements, the Tribunal at the judgment stage held that their witness statements on Oath not have accompanied the petition were incompetent. They were disregarded, together with the exhibits referred to by them. At the Court of Appeal, the Appellants initially appealed against the decision, excluding the evidence of PW2 and PW3 by virtue of Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Grounds of Appeal. But in the Brief of Argument, the Appellants failed to formulate issues for determination therefrom. The Grounds challenged were thus deemed abandoned by the tribunal. The first Respondent did not call a witness but apparently relied on evidence elicited under cross-examination of the Appellants’ witnesses, as well as witnesses called by the other Respondents. The first Respondent equally tendered the following exhibits, namely:

1. Exhibit D1-CTC of Form EC8D and;
2. Exhibit D2-CTC of Form EC8E.

The second Respondent called two witnesses namely DW1 and DW2.  The third Respondent called DW3 and tendered exhibits D10 to D15A. The other Respondents equally defended the allegations made against them in the Petition in their respective rights. The Tribunal ruled on the interlocutory applications and notably held that Ground 1 of the Petition challenging the qualification of the third Respondent was founded on his membership of the second Respondent, over which the tribunal had no jurisdiction. The tribunal found that, not being members of the second Respondent, the appellant had no locus to ventillate that particular grievance. The Tribunal equally maintained in the final analysis that the Appellants failed to prove that the third, fifth, and seventh Respondents were not qualified to contest the office. On other grounds, the Tribunal held that the Appellants equally failed to prove “…non-compliance with the Electoral Act, 2022, they failed to prove that the third Respondent was not duly elected by the majority of the lawful votes cast as evidence by Exhibits D1 and D2.”

The tribunal finally held that the two grounds of the petition were “devoid of merit” and accordingly dismissed the Petition. At the court below, the Court considered the four separate appeals lodged by the Appellants arising from the Rulings delivered in the same judgment of the Tribunal, all bearing separate appeal numbers, and initially held that the procedure was an anomaly. The Court below held that the resolution of the four interlocutory appeals will not determine the outcome of main appeal against the judgment and the Court below proceeded to strike out the four appeals filed separately before it. Thereafter, the Court below determined the main appeal on the merit while considering all the paragraphs that had been struck out by the tribunal. The court below held on page 3491 of the record as follows When it found that even though the tribunal found the ground and paragraphs in support of the petition incompetent, it still considered the merit of it. Abiru JCA and opined thus:

“Now, as stated earlier, after the granting of the application of the second Respondent, the third Respondent, and sixth Respondent, and consequent striking out of paragraphs of the petition and paragraphs of the Reply of the Appellants to the third Respondent’s Reply to the Petition, the lower court proceeded to consider all the averments in these paragraphs of pleadings that were struck out on the merit on the basis of the evidence led by the parties on the records. It was on the basis of the findings made by the lower court in its consideration of the case of the parties on the merits that it dismissed the claims of the Appellants. The grant of the applications of the three Respondents and the striking out of portions of the pleadings of the Appellants was thus cosmetic and was not fatal to the case of the Appellants; It was not the basis upon which the lower Court dismissed the claims of the Appellants “.

My Lords, the Tribunal determined the issues on the merit. I am surprised at the reasoning of the Appellant’s Counsel on page 13 of the Appellant’s brief that “the Court below must be deemed to know that it would have been unnecessary to enter into any merits of any part of the case on appeal, if the Appellants had not appealed against the rulings and others in question, because the Appellants would have been deemed to have conceded the threshold issue of jurisdiction and competence, rendering any further consideration of the case on appeal otoise”. No doubt, the Appellant had a right of appeal against the interlocutory decision and the decision on the merit. However, when the determination of an issue in favour of a party who raised it will not affect the result of the appeal, the issue is of no value. See OKEREKE v. NWANKWO (2003) 9 NWLR pt. 826 pg. 592. It would be an academic and useless venture as an adventure on this point in the circumstances of this appeal. See ARDO V. INEC (SUPRA), ODEDO v. INEC (SUPRA), UGBA v. SUSWAN (SUPRA), IBRAHIM v. ABDULLAHI (2019) LPELR – 48984 (SC), APC v. ENWEREM (2022) LPELR – 57816 (SC), ODEY v. APC (2023) LPELR – 60044(SC). For example, the issue of the preliminary objectives raised and upheld by the Tribunal would have been of utmost importance were the tribunal terminated the hearing after upholding the objections of the Respondents to Ground 1 of the Petition. At the hearing of the preliminary objection at the apex court, the success of such an objection terminates the appeal as it always considered before determining the appeal. See EKEMEZIE v. IFEANACHO & ORS (2019) LPELR – 46518(SC).

The trite principle of law is that an issue that is not crucial in an appeal, and which, even if determined in favour of a party, may not end the controversy, ought not to be formulated for the determination on the appeal. It may serve no purpose, even if the complaint is upheld in favour of the Appellants. See EHIMARE v. EMHONYON (1985) 2 SC 49. When the determination of an issue in favour of the party who raised it will not affect the result of an appeal. The issue is of no value. See OKEREKE v. NWANKWO (2003) SUPRA. See also OVIVIE v. DELTA STATE CO. LTD (2023) LPELR 60460 (SC). Where this court concluded thus:

“My Lords, it has long been settled that where issues are found not to be crucial, but are merely theoretical and of no practical utilitarian value, pronouncing on same will be an exercise in futility, and failure to do so cannot have any effect on the decision of the court, particularly if there would be no miscarriage of justice. Their determination would, therefore, make no practical or tangible addition to the outcome of the matter or to the decision of the lower Court being appealed against. Issues two and four before the lower Court fall into this category”.

 It is wrong to contend, as the Appellants did, that the court below endorsed the “…. disembowelling of the Petition by the trial Tribunal”. On the contrary, the Court below endorsed the holistic consideration of the allegation in the Petition by the Tribunal. Both courts below proceeded and considered the issue and jurisdiction to entertain the facts on which the issue of qualification was hoisted and determined the same on the merit. Even if the court below ought to have determined these appeals as constituted, the failure to do so has not caused miscarriage of justice. This issue is resolved against the Appellants.

The other important issue for consideration is whether the Appellants established that the third, fifth, or seventh respondents were not qualified to contest the election of 18th March 2023. In arguing this issue, the Appellants contended that the pleadings and evidence show that the Appellants proved on the balance of probability that the third, fifth, and seventh respondents were not qualified to contest the election as Governor of Abia State because the third, fifth, and seventh Respondents were not members and were not validly sponsored by the second, fourth, and sixth Respondents under section 177(c) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered). The election and return of the third Respondent violated section 177(c) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered). The fifth Respondent was a public servant who acted in the capacity of chief of staff to the Governor of the Abia State within the definition of public service under section 318 of the 1999 CFRN (as altered) and who did not resign from office 30 days before the election as required by section 182 (i) (g) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered). The learned Appellants’ Counsel argued that the constitutional qualification of the third, fifth, and seventh Respondents were the very basis of the Petition at the trial Tribunal, this is because by the virtue of section 177 (c) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered) which provides thus:

“177. A person shall be qualified for the election to the office of governor if: c) He is a member of a political party and is sponsored by the political party.

 Counsel insisted that the provision above is unambiguous, clear, and concise. The plain and ordinary meaning of the words ( the literal rule) applies. It is a constitutional pre-requisite for contesting election as Governor. A constitutional pre-qualification is imposed on the membership of the 3rd, 5th, and 7th Respondents in the 2nd, 4th, and 6th Respondents. Counsel submitted that the Court below wrongly concluded that it was the case of the Appellants that the 3rd and 7th Respondents were not in the register of members of the 2nd and 6th Respondents submitted to the 1st Respondent before their respective primary elections, which is proof that they were not members of the Political Parties which they subsequently purported to represent in the elections under reference, as an attempt to insert an untoward meaning into Section 177(c) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered). This untenable conclusion and misreading of Petitioners’ evidence and pleading a wrongful insertion of anything into Section 177(c) of the 1999 (as altered) is wrong. Appellants’ Counsel vociferously argued that the pleading and evidence under reference shows this is direct proof and undisputed violation of Section 177 (c) 1999 CFRN (as altered) by the 3rd and 7th Respondents. Thus, membership of a Political Party is established by production of the party register and other relevant documents if the issues arises. See TARZOOR v. IORAERV & ORS (2016) LPELR – 25975 (SC). Where the issue at hand is that the 3rd and 7th Respondents were not members of the 2nd and 6th Respondents, the Court below was duty bound to examine the register of members and could not abdicate the duty to review evidence duly and validly placed before it. Learned Appellants’ Counsel insisted that the Appellants established by cogent evidence at the trial Tribunal that the third Respondent was not qualified to contest the election because at the time of the election, the third Respondent was not a member of the second Respondent and was not sponsored by the second Respondent. Counsel argued that the third Respondent was not a member of the second Respondent and could not have been validly sponsored by the second Respondent were established by pleading and proof by the appellants that:

1. The third Respondent was an active member of the second Appellant at the time of election;
2. The third Respondent’s name was in the membership register Exhibit P12 of the second Appellant in Isiala Ngwa South L.G.A showing the name of the third Respondent.
3. The third Respondent’s name was not in the membership register of the second respondent presented to INEC 30 days before the primaries.

 Counsel argued that the contentions about updates to party membership and waiver contained in Exhibit D7 are irrelevant as the issue of waiver is an exercise in futility which this Court must not endorse.

In reply, the learned Respondent’s Counsel all argued that the Court below did not just hold that the issue of membership in a political cannot be ventilated at an Election Petition Tribunal. The Court was certain that it can , but that it is dependent on the nature of the complaint presented at the Election Petition Tribunal. Learned Appellants Counsel argued that the basis of the Appellants case is outside the contemplation of Section 177 (c) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered). Counsel submitted that the Appellants’ case is essentially founded on non-compliance with Section 77 (3) of the Electoral Act. It is on this basis that the Appellants have erroneously dragged in Section 177 (c) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered) and Section 134 (1)  of the Electoral Act.

There is no doubt that at paragraph 1.5 and 1.6 of the petition, the Appellants boldly and unequivocally affirmed that the third Respondent was sponsored by the second Respondent when they averred thus:

” 1.5. The second Respondent, the Labour Party (LP), is a registered political party and it is sponsored by the third Respondent as her candidate at the Governorship election held in Abia State on the 18th day of March 2023.

1.6.  The third Respondent, Dr. Alex Chioma Otti of Umuchim village in Ehi Na Uguru in Isiala Ngwa South Local Government Area of Abia State, was the candidate of and sponsored by the second Respondent, the Labour Party, at the Governorship election held in Abia State on the 18th day of March 2023″.

Similar pleadings were entered for the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Respondents in terms of the admission of sponsorship. In addition to the pleadings, in the above-mentioned paragraphs, at paragraph 6.1 of the same Petition, the Appellants pleaded thus:

  “6.1, your Petitioner state that the 3rd Respondent was not sponsored or validly sponsored by any political party, including the 2nd respondent Labour Party”.

In  JEGEDE V. INEC (2021) 14 NWLR (PT.1797) PG. 409, Agim JSC concluded thus:

“This Court is bound by its decision above in keeping with the doctrine of staree decisis. The Court of Appeal decision that paragraph 12 of the petition, if read together with other paragraphs of the petition challenging the validity of sponsorship, does not amount to an admission that the 1st Respondent was in fact sponsored by the 2nd Respondent is wrong. It therefore wrongly set aside the decision of the Election Tribunal that is an admission of the fact that the 2nd Respondent sponsored the 1st Respondent. The said decision of the trial court is hereby restored”.

My Lords the Appellants’ case is based on the following:

1. Section 77 of the Electoral Act compels the second Respondent to maintain a register of members which will be submitted at least 30 days before the party primary.

1. The name of the second Respondent was not in the third Respondent’s register so submitted.

III. No person can be sponsored as a candidate unless his or her name was on the register before the conduct of primaries.

1. The third Respondent was a registered member of the second Appellant who participated in its primaries and lost before showing up with the second Respondent.

 If indeed, the 3rd Respondent defected to the second Respondent, it can only mean that he became a member of the second Respondent. If he thus became a member of the second Respondent, the Appellants conceded that movement, but in spite of that, tenaciously contend that the legal proof of that membership of the second Respondent is if and only if the third Respondent’s register of members, which was availed to the first Respondent 30 days before the primaries, embodied the third Respondent’s name. For the Appellants to succeed in this grossly speculative argument, they must produce a statutory provision to the effect that a person’s membership in a party is determined by the presence of his or her name in the register of members 30 days before the primaries. There is no such law in existence, and such far-reaching postulation cannot be endorsed on mere argument and rationalization. no matter how passionate the Appellants’ discontent may be.

I could not have put the reasoning on this issue better than Abiru JCA when he held at page 3511 to 3512 of the Record.

Where the challenge is that the candidate was not a member of the political party and was not sponsored by the political party as its candidate in the election for Governor as required by section 177 (c) of the 1999 Constitution. It is a post-election matter. But where the challenge to the qualification of a candidate for election is predicated on the validity of his nomination process by his political party vis-a-vis the provisions of the Electoral Act, it is a pre-election matter- *JEGEDE V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (2021) 14 NWLR (PT. 1797) 409, ACTION PEOPLES PARTY V. OBASEKI (2022) 13 NWLR (PT. 1846) 1 @ 45, FALEKE V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (2022) 13 NWLR (PT. 1543) 61, ONI V. OYEBANJI (2023) LPELR – 60699 (SC).

Now, a challenge does not fit into either side of the divide simply because the party making the challenge or the party opposing the challenge says so. It depends on the nature of the complaints made on the pleadings. Now, what was the nature of the complaints made out by the Appellants on their pleadings?  It is an established rule of adjudication that, in determining the case made by a party, a court must read all the paragraphs of the pleadings of the party together to get a flowing story of the party, and not a few paragraphs in isolation and it is the totality of the pleadings that states “the case of the party.”

His Lordship concluded as follows on page 3512 of the Record

*”Reading through the pleadings of the Appellants, the gravamen of their complaints against the third Respondent was that he was not a member and thus not eligible for sponsorship by the second Respondent as its candidate in the election as his name was not on the membership register of the second Respondent, that it was obligated by the provisions of the Electoral Act to maintain and submit the first Respondent 30 days before the holding of its primary election. It was their case that by reason thereof, the third Respondent could not have validly and lawfully partaken in the nomination process of the second Respondent for the selection of its candidate for the election, and that the second Respondent could not have validly and lawfully nominated and sponsored the third Respondent as its candidate at the election. It was their case that the third Respondent was a registered member of the second Appellant and took part in the Governorship Primary Election of the second Appellant, held on the 26th of May 2022, which he lost, and that he remained a member of the second Appellant as at the date of the election. They admitted that the 2nd Respondent forwarded the INEC form EC9 of the 3rd Respondent to the 1st Respondent as its candidate for the election, wherein it was stated that the 3rd Respondent was a member of the 2nd Respondent, but it was their case that this could not have been lawfully and validly done, and that the 3rd Respondent was not a lawful candidate of the 2nd Respondent.

Further that:

It was not the case of the Appellants that the second Respondent did not nominate and sponsor the third Respondent as its candidate at the election, and/or that the sixth Respondent did not nominate and sponsor the seventh Respondent as its candidate at the election. Their complaint was that the second Respondent and the sixth Respondent could not have been validly and lawfully done so because the names of the “the third Respondent and of the seventh Respondent were not contained in the membership registers of the second Respondent and sixth Respondent respectively, and which membership registers they were obligated to maintain and submit to the first Respondent at least 30 days before the primary election by virtue of Section 77 of the Electoral Act, 2022. They questioned the legitimacy of the nomination and sponsorship of the third Respondent by the second Respondent and of the and of the seventh Respondent, by the sixth Respondent, because they surmised that neither of the two political parties could nominate and sponsor anyone whose name was not in its membership register at least 30 days before the date of their primary election”.

See also ANPP v. USMAN (2008) 12 NWLR (PT. 1100) 1 at 54-55, UGWU v. ARARUME (2007) 12 NWLR (PT. 1048) 367 (SC), per Onnoghen JSC (as he then was).

I am of the view that the Appellants under the guise of employing the combined provisions of Section 177 (c) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered) which requires a candidate to be sponsored by a political party, and Section 134(a) of the Electoral Act, which allows a Petitioner to question an election on the ground of qualification of the person elected, have strayed by their arguments into the realm of a political question, which is not justifiable.

There is no merit at all in this appeal, which is not based on law.

 It must be stressed that the Appellants in this case are not contending that the third Respondent did not in fact participate at all in the stages of the election. Their case is found strictly on membership. That is to say that the third Respondent, who they claim is the member, contested the primary and the general election and won on the platform of the second Respondent. They hoisted this on the reliance placed on their own membership register and did not take into cognizance the fact that the third Respondent joined the second Respondent and in consideration of the time constraint was granted I was granted a waiver by the second Respondent to contest the primary and the general election on their platform.

After reading of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, one would expect that the Apex Court would not have to countenance this type of appeal. As I read the arguments in the Appellants’ brief filed by Abubakar Malami, SAN. I am compelled to re-echo and adopt wholesome as mine views expressed in the erudite judgment of Abiru JCA on page 3521-3522 of the record where his Lordship stated as follows:

*”This court must say that it is rather bewildered by this case. It is a huge joke, and the Appellants and their handlers, their Counsel, must have confused the lower Court and this court as jesters’ arenas, manned by clowns and comedians. Otherwise, how does one explain the temerity of the appellants who scored 24,091 votes out of a total of 368,541 votes cast at election, that is 6.7% of the votes, approaching the lower Court and this Court to declare and return them as the winners of the election? And to, in doing so, disqualify the third Respondent who scored 175,467 votes, almost eight times his votes, the fifth Respondent who scored 88,529 votes, almost four times his votes, and the seventh Respondent who scored 28,972 votes, and to find and hold that they were the only ones qualified to contest in the election. The Appellants did not challenge the validity of the votes cast at the election. They accepted that they were roundly rejected by the electorate. Yet they wanted the lower Court and now this Court to declare them winners of the election. This can only happen in a comedy skit. The Abia State Governorship election was held in furtherance of our democratic journey. The term “democracy” comes from the Greek language and it means rule by the (simple) people. Democracy, as defined by the dictionary, is government by the people in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly of them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system. In the phrase of Abraham Lincoln, democracy is a government of the people by the people for the people. All democracies are systems in which citizens freely make political decisions by majority rule. Therefore, in every election, it is the wish and desire of the majority of the voters that must always be the determining factor. Any electoral system that subsumes under any guise, the wishes of the majority in choosing the representatives of the people cannot be said to be democratic and fair.

 It is thus the responsibility of every player in the election process or electoral system of any democratic government, be he a participant or an organizer, a supervisor, or in whatever capacity, to make laws, work the laws, operate the laws, and interpret the laws in such a way that they enthrone at every stage of the process the desires and wishes of the majority of the electorate. These are the higher ideals of the democratic process and it by so doing that the democratic ideal can be advanced and deepened in the society. It is hoped that the Appellants and their lawyers will learned to live by these higher ideals of the democratic process.

My Lords, may wish to note that the actual poll was not seriously challenged from the Tribunal to this Court by the Appellants.

In the circumstances of this appeal, there is no reason to subvert the political will of the people who voted overwhelmingly for the second and third Respondents who scored 175,467 votes to yield to the spurious and untenable legal and factual arguments of the Appellants who scored 24,091 votes. There is no merit in this appeal which is frivolous and vexatious.

 I affirm the judgement of the court below in Appeal No: CA/OW/EP/GOV/AB/35/2023.

I abide by the order as to costs.

Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju

Justice, Supreme Court

APPEARANCES

ABUBAKAR MALAMI, SAN; UBONG ESOP AKPAN, ESQ; REMI AWE, ESQ; AND IDONGESIT EKPO, ESQ, FOR THE APPELLANTS.

J.O. ADESINA, SAN, FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT; WITH HIM, DR. NASIRU TIJJANI, ESQ; S.G. UDOH, ESQ AND W.O. EKHOVBIYE, ESQ.

 TOCHUKWU  NWEKE, ESQ, FOR THE 2ND RESPONDENT; WITH HIM, DR OBINNA ONYA, ESQ AND JULIUS MBA, ESQ.

OMOSANYA POPOOLA, ESQ, FOR THE 3RD RESPONDENT; WITH HIM, T.K OYEDEJI, ESQ AND M.K FIDELIS, ESQ.

UDOCHI IHEANACHO, ESQ, FOR THE 4TH AND 5TH RESPONDENTS; WITH HIM, JAMES OKPARA, ESQ; CHUKWUEMEKA NWAOGU, ESQ; EMEKA EZE, ESQ; CHIJIOKE NWOGU, ESQ AND CHIKEODI OKEORJI.

C.N NWIGWE, ESQ; WITH HIM, ADEBIMPE OREKOYA, ESQ, FOR THE 6TH RESPONDENT.

NNAMDI N. AHAAIWE, ESQ, FOR THE 7TH RESPONDENT; WITH HIM, OGOCHUKWU N. OFOR, ESQ AND OBINNA C. OCHIOBI, ESQ.