JUDGMENT DELIVERED BY I.M.M. SAULAWA, JSC- SC/ CV/1165/2023

It is trite, that Governorship elections were conducted nationwide by the 3rd Respondent on March 18, 2023. Both the Appellant and the 1st Respondent had keenly contested the said election under the platforms of their respective political parties, the People’s Democratic Party (the 4th Respondent) and the All Progressives Congress (the 2d Respondent).

On March 21, 2023, the 3 Respondent declared the Appellant as winner of the said election having scored majority lawful votes totaling to 377,721. The 1st Respondent came a distant second with 311,976 lawful votes. Where upon, the 3rd Respondent returned the Appellant as the duly elected Governor of Zamfara State, in accordance with the provisions of section 179(2) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended.
Not unnaturally, the 15 Respondent was utterly dissatisfied with the declaration and return of the Appellant as the winner of the said election, thus he filed a petition at the Governorship Eiection Petition Tribunal Zamfara State upon the following two
grounds:

ії.The 1st Respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the election.
The election was invalid by reason of corrupt practices or non-compliance with the provision of Electoral Act. “

The 1st Respondent prayed the tribunal for the following reliefs:
That it may be determined and thus determined that the 1st Respondent Dauda Lawal of the 2d Respondent was not duly elected or returned by the majority of lawful votes cast at the Zamfara State Governorship election held on the 18th march, 2023.

That it may be determined and thus determined that the ist Petitioner be
declared validly elected having polled the highest number of lawful votes cast at the election.
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
That it may be determined and thus determined that the Zamfara State
Governorship election held on 18th
March, 2023 is inconclusive.
That fresh election be ordered into the affected Polling Units where elections did not hold, were cancelled or there was over-voting.

At the conclusion of the pre-hearing session, the petition proceeded to hearing. At the end of hearing of the petition, the Tribunal delivered its judgment on 18/09/2023, to the conclusive effect:

Finally, upon thorough consideration of the pleadings/ Evidence demonstrated and decisions herein before referred the Tribunal is of the view that the Petitioners have not proved the allegations in the petition to be entitled to the reliefs sought. This issue is resolved in favour of the Respondent.
Consequently, the petition is dismissed. The declaration and return of the 1st Respondent DAUDA LAWAL by the 3ª Respondent be and is hereby affirmed. Cost in the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Naira only (A500,000) is awarded to each of the Respondents.
Judgment is hereby entered.
Being dissatisfied with the judgment of the Tribunal, the 1st Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal sitting at Sokoto.

The Court below heard the said appeal and delivered its judgment on 16/11/2023, to the conclusive effect:
Although issues 1 and 2 have been resolved in favour of the Respondents issues 3, 4, 6 and 7 which are carnal of the Appeal are resolved in favour of the Appellants.

Consequently, this appeal is hereby allowed in part.
In order to forestall any ambiguity, the Court hereby orders as follows:
A. The Gubernatorial Election held in Zamfara State on the 18th March, 2023 is inconclusive and the return of the 1st Respondent is hereby set aside.
B. The 3ª Respondent is hereby directed to hold fresh election in Maradun Local Government and the affected polling units in Birni Mogaji (sic) Local Government and Bukuyum Local Government.
The Appellant was utterly dissatisfied with the judgment of the court, thus deemed it expedient to file the instant appeal. By the Notice of Appeal, filed on 28/11/2023, the Appellant has urged upon this court a total of 4 reliefs:
• To allow the Appeal.
• To set aside the judgment of the lower court delivered on 16 day of November 2023 in Appeal No. CA/S/EP/GOV/ZM/21/2023 save the part resolving issues 1 & 2 in favor of the Appellant.
• To set aside all the consequential orders made by the court below.
• To affirm and/or restore the judgment of the Zamfara State Governorship Election Petition Tribunal delivered on the 18th day of Sepember, 2023.
• To dismiss the 1st and 2d Respondents’ Petition. On 01/2024, when the appeal came up for hearing, the learned senior counsel had the opportunity of addressing the court and adopting their respective briefs of argument, thereby warranting the court to reserve judgment to today. The Appellant’s brief of argument, settled on 07/12/2023 by DD Dodo, SAN, spans a total of 10 pages. At pages 9-10 of the said brief, 10 issues have been couched:

I. Whether in view of Exhibits RA-R10A and Exhibits P163-P175, the court below was right to order for a fresh election in Maradun Local Government Area (Grounds 1 and 2).

ії. Whether by virtue of clauses 57, 62 and 67 of the regulations and guidelines for the conduct of Elections and Exhibits P202G-P266G, the 1st and 2 Respondents were able to establish the margin of lead principle in the instant petition to justify the court below declaring the Zamfara State Governorship Election inconclusive and ordering fresh elections in Birni Magaji and Bukuyum Local Government Areas (Grounds 3, 4 and 5).

ill. Whether, despite the failure of the ist and 2nd Respondents to appeal against the decision of the Tribunal that the margin of lead principle relates to the total number of voters who actually collected their permanent voters cards 7 in the Polling Units, the Court below was right to have dismissed the Appellant’s Motion of Notice dated 19/10/23 and filed on 20/10/23 (Grounds 6 and 7).

iv.Whether the court below was right to grant both the substantive and alternative reliefs in this petition (Ground 10).

v.Whether the court below was right when it relied on section 137 of Electoral Act, 2022 and held that the evidence of PW1-PW18 are not hearsay and the said evidence were linked to specific aspects of the 1st and 2d Respondent’s case (Grounds 9 and 14).

vi. Whether the court below had the jurisdiction to entertain and pronounce on the issue of noncompliance on the basis of Ground 2 of the petition (Ground 8),

vii. Whether in the absence of any ground of appeal on evaluation or weight of evidence, the court below was right to re-evaluate evidence and to hold that 1st and 2d Respondents proved their entitlement to the reliefs sought. (Grounds 11, 13 and 17).

vill, Having found that Exhibit P182C was not legible, whether the court below was right to rely on section 137 of the Electoral Act, 2022 to hold that Exhibit P182C showed non-compliance. (Ground 15).

Ix.Whether there was any pleading and proof that Exhibit R12C was mutilated to justify the decision of the court below that it lacked probative value (Ground 12).

x.Whether the court below was right to hold that the order of the Tribunal striking out paragraphs 24, 52-59 and 61 of the petition was erroneous.
(Ground 16)

Contrariwise, the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ brief, settled by Dr. Onyechi Ikpeazu, SAN on 12/12/2023, spans a total of 37 pages. At pages 4-5 of the brief, 9 issues have been nominated for determination:

I. Whether in view of Exhibits RIA-R10A and Exhibits P153-P175, the lower court below was right to order for a fresh elections in Maradun Local Government Area (Grounds
1 and 2),
Ii. Whether the decision of the lower court to order fresh elections in Maradun, Birnin Magaji and Bukuyum was perverse and occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
(Grounds 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7).

Iii. Whether the lower court was right to have granted the part of the substantive and alternative reliefs in the petition (Ground 10).

Iv. Whether the lower court was right when it held that the evidence of PW1-PW18 were not hearsay but linked the evidence on record to specific aspects of the 1st and 2d Respondent’s case, in line with the Electoral Act, 2022. (Distilled from Ground 9 and 14)

v. Having failed to appeal against the specific finding of the trial Tribunal before the lower court affirming ground 2 of the petition whether the Appellant can raise that point at the Supreme Court. (Ground
8).
vi. Whether the lower court was right when it re-evaluated the evidence before the court after it held that the trial Tribunal failed to properly evaluate the evidence before it.
(Grounds 11, 13 and 17).

Vii. Whether the lower court was correct to reevaluate the documents before it relying on section 137 of the Electoral Act, 2022.
(Grounds 15).

vill. Whether the lower court was right to have that exhibit R12C lacked probative value because it was mutilate with a series of cancellations, without countersigning (Ground 12).

ix.Whether the lower court was right to hold that the order of the Tribunal striking out paragraphs 24, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 and 61 of the petition was erroneous.
(Grounds 16).

Having am ply considered the nature and circumstances surrounding the appeal, the eloquent submissions of the learned counsel contained in the respective briefs thereof vis-à-vis the records of appeal as a whole, I am of the paramount view that 10 the issues raised by the Appellant and the 1st and 20d Respondents are not at all mutually exclusive.

Most particularly, I am appreciative of the fact that issue 1 of the Appellant and the 15 and 2d Respondents issue 1 are virtually derivative of Grounds 1 and 2 of the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal. The crucial question raised in both issues is whether in view of Exhibits RIA-RF10A and Exhibits 163-P175, the court below was right to order for a fresh election in MARADUN Local Government Area.

By virtue of the facts pleaded in the petition nay the evidence of the PW1 and PW17, the Governorship election inquestion was undoubtedly held in Maradun Local Government Area on 18/03/2023, and thai result were duly declared. It’s equally in evidence, that the 1st and 2d Respondents duly deployed their Agents at the various polling units in the said Maradun LGA.

Interestingly, the 1st and 2d Respondent’s (petitioners) did not deem it expedient to lodge a complaint against the conduct of the election at the Polling Units in Maradun LGA. Not surprisingly, the 1st and 2d Respondents’ brief (at page 5 paragraph 4.1) responded attested to that fact: 4.1. It is important to state that the case of the 1st and 2nd Respondents has never been about the polling unit results or Ward Results for Maradun Local Government. As can be gleaned from the evidence of the 1st and 2d Respondents at the Tribunal their case was based on the failure to reckon with the form EC 8C (Exhibit 182C) emanating from Maradun Local Government, where the 1st Respondent’s scored 98,506 votes.

Contrariwise, the Appellant vide the RW9 tendered the Polling Unit Results of Maradun LGA and the the same were accordingly admitted as Exhibits RIA-R10A (i.e the Form EC8A series). The
PW19, Dr. Ahmed Kainawa, who was the Maradun LGA collation officer failed to correctly collate the election results for that LGA.

The said Exhibits P163-P175 (Ward Election Results) were expressly admitted by the 3rd Respondent to be wrong and unreliable (see Reply @ paragraph 4, page 4-39 volume I of the record). The said Exhibits P163-P175 were mutilated and not counter-signed by the Agents. This allegation was not challenged by the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

What’s more, the 1st and 2nd Respondents made Exhibit P182C as the foundation of their case in order to prove Ground. I of the petition, to the effect that the Appellant was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes. Ironically, however, even the 12
PW19, who procured the exhibits could not defend them but rather discredited response (see pages 1905-1910, volume 3 of the Record):

12 PW19, who procured the exhibits could not defend them but rather discredited same (see pages 1905-1910, volume 3 of the Record):

Thus, not surprisingly, the Tribunal in its wisdom came to the finding that the Exhibit P182C was not deserving of any probative value (see pages 2132 and 2135 of volume 3 of the Record):|

With respect to FORM EC8C for Maradun, Exhibit p182C the pivot of their claim of 98,508 votes in Maradun we have reproduced the evidence of PW19 elaborately earlier on in this judgment.
PW19 the maker of exhibit p182C when tested under cross-examinationthe  admitted repeatedly
that the writing is not clear. He could not see the scores in Exhibit P182. He stated categorically that APC did not score 98,506 votes. The result of 98,505 votes is not the actual result.
Further the score for the PDP 618 is not the actual result.
We hold that this lead
unequivocal admission by PW19 which lend credence to Respondents case has discredited.
Impugned exhibit p. 182C:

13 The petitioners failed to tender to seeks of results the alleged authentic and incorrect result FUNDAMENTALLY WE REPEAT… NO FORM EC8A OR EC8B WAS TENDERED TO SUPPORT ALLEGED 98, 506 VOTES in Maradun… by section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011 is properly founded. He who alleges must prove…
Without putting in evidence the necessary documents issue of computation of results does not arise. We agree with the Respondents’ submission that the case of UZODINMA VS.
THEDIOHA (supra) is not on all fours with the facis of this case.

In my considered view, the foregoing finding of the Court below is very much in tune with the pleadings vis-à-vis the evidence on record. The said finding is undoubtedly credible, and unassailable, thus ought to be upheld by this Court. And I so hold.

In the instant case, the 15 and 2a Respondent (as petitioners) averred in their petition that the use of the Electoral Forms EC8A, EC8B, CC8C, et al (listed in paragraph 21 of the petition) was mandatory, upon which they could rely in proof of the petition in the course of the trial. The is and 2nd respondents equally in paragraphs 22, 23 and 24 of the petition:

1. The Petitioners state that their agents were at all Polling units, Wards Collation Centres and the Local Government Collation in Maradun Local Government.Area of Zamfara State during the conduct of Zamfara State Governorship Election.
2. The petitioners aver that their agents were given copies of Form EC8A, EC8B and ECSC at the Polling Units, Ward and Local Government levels during the conduct of Zamfara State Governorship Election in Maradun Local Government Area.
3. The petitioners state that after the conduct of Zamfara State Governorship Election in Zamfara State, the 3ª Respondent contrary to actual votes scored by the candidates at the Election collated the following resultsfor the Polling Units at Maradun Local Government Area of Zamfara State in FormEC8B
What’s more, under paragraphs 28 and 30 of the Petition, the 15 and 2d Respondents averred: 28. The Petitioners averred that the Form EC8C for Maradun Local Government Area relied on by the 3a Respondent is mutilated, tainted with serious of cancellations and the figures doctored without reference to the actual scores of the petitioners.
30. The petitioners averred that by the actual score of candidates at the election as contained in the actual Forms EC8A, EC8B and EC8C given to Agents of the petitioners during the conduct of Zamfara State Governorship Election, the petitioners would have won the election even without conducting elections in the four (4) registration areas of Birnin Magaji Local Government namely: Kiyawa, Dan Fami/Sabon Birnin/Dan Ali, Nasarawa Godeal East and Gora.

The petitioner shall plead and rely on duplicate copies given to their Agents at the Polling Units, Ward Collation Center and Local Government Collation Center and the 3d Respondent CTC of
Forms EC8A, EC8B and EC8C. Now, having so pleaded the foregoing paragraphs of the Petition that their Polling Unit Agents were actually issued with the electoral forms at the conclusion of the election inquestion, the petitioners (1st and 2nd Respondents) were under an onerous duty to tender those documents in proof of their petition. Alas, the 1st and 2d Respondents woefully failed to discharge the burden reposed in them to prove their said assertions.

It was on the basis of the 1st and 2^* Respondents’ failure to prove their petition, that the Tribunal deemed it imperative to dismiss the petition and affirm the declaration and return of the Appellant by the 3a Respondent, as the duly elected Governor of Zamfara State.

However, the Court below in its wisdom thought otherwise, and set aside the judgment of the Tribunal. The Court below predicated its reasoning for allowing the appeal on the basis that Exhibit R12C lacked probative value, as Political Party Agents did not sign the alteration thereon and that there was multiple alterations without initialing. The Court below was, however, convinced that:

The Appellants have placed credible cogent and uncontroverted evidence before the Tribunal and have proved their entitlement to the relief sought in the petition.
The Court below expressed utter dismay regarding the 3rd Respondent’s preference to using figures (downloaded) from the IREV in computing the results of the election and thereby rejecting the collated results. Accordingly, in striking down the IREV (Exhibit R12C or 2RIC), the Court below stated:

The submission has been made by the Appellants and we agued that based on the reasoning of Okoro JSC in Atiku Abubakar and Ors. V. INEC & Ors. SL/CV/953/2023, IREV IS not part of the collation system. It is meant for the viewing public. Consequently, it is manifestly wrong for the 3′ Respondent to use figures or result from IREV in computing the Result for the Gubernatorial Election,
See pages 2379-2382 of the volume 4 of the Records.

Contrariwise, however, as aptly posited by the Appellant’s learned silk, the decision of this Court in ATIKU VS. INEC (supra) must have been quoted and relied upon out of context by the Court below. For the avoidance of any lingering doubt, upon interpreting the provision of paragraph 93 of the INEC’S regulations and Guidelines, this Court held:

The elaborate arrangement made by the 1st Respondent for collation of results is to make sure that at every point of collation, there is a result either from the hard copy with INEC or electronically transmitted copy, or IREV PORTAL copy or hard copy to the Nigeria and finally a copy given to the Political parties.
Against the backdrop of the foregoing passage of decision of this Court in ATIKU VS. INEC (2023) supra, it is beyond any disputation, that this Court neither found nor held that INEC (3*d Respondent) should not rely on, or use, the IREV copies of result for collation, contrary to the misconceived findings of the Court below at pages 2379 – 2381 of volume 4 of the Records.

The post-election and collation of results procedure is duly provided for under the Electoral Act, 2022:
62. – (1) After the recording and announcement of the result, the presiding officer shall deliver same along with election materials under security and accompanied by the candidates or their polling agents where available, to such person as may be prescribed by the commission.

(2) The commission shall compile, maintain and update, on a continuous basis, a register of election results to be known as the National Electronic Realstere of Elisting dates which shall be
repository of polling unit by polling unit results, including collated election results, of each election conducted by the commission in the Federation, and the Register of Election Results shall be kept in electronic format by the commission at its national headquarters.

(3) Any person or political party may obtain from the commission, on payment of such fees a may be determined by the commission, a certified true copy of any election result kept in the National Electronic Register of Election Results for a State, Local Government, Area Council, registration area or Electoral Ward or Polling Unit, as the case may be, and the certified true copy may be in printed or electronic format.

As alluded to above, the 15 and 2″” Respondents’ pleading in their Petition was that the 1st Respondent had scored a total of 98,506 in all the polling units in Maradun Local Government Area, and that the Appellant wherein scored a paltry 618 votes. They 20  based their allegation on duplicate copies of the Polling Unit Results in Form EC8A given to the Agents thereof by the Polling Unit Presiding Officers for Polling Units in Maradun Local Government Area.

The 15 and 2 Respondents relied on Exhibits P163 to 175, the purported copies of Ward Election Results (in Forms EC8B) and Exhibit P182C, the Duplicate copies of Collated Results in Form EC8C for Maradun Local Government Area Collation Results given to their Agents. However, Exhibits P163 to P175, (Form EC8B) glaringly contradict Exhibit P182 (Form ECSC). The Tribunal made some far-reaching findings in the vexed judgment, to the effect that Exhibit 182C was devoid of any probative
value, as it was utterly discredited by the very PW19 that made it.
The Tribunal came to the most inevitable conclusion in its finding that:
PW19 the maker of exhibit P182C when tested under cross-examination admitted repeatedly
that the writing is not clear. He could not see the scores in exhibit P182C, he stated categorically that APC did not score 98,506 votes.

The result of 95,506 votes is not the actual result. We hold that this lucid unequivocal admission by PW19 which lends 21 credence to the Respondents’ case had discredited exhibit P182C.

Exhibit R12C was used to declare result of local Government.
Exhibit P182C duplicate form EC8C for Maradun Local Government is not legible.

Most regrettably, however, despite the above obvious credible and unassailable findings of the Tribunal, the Court below, in its wisdom, deemed it expedient to hold that Exhibit RIC (made from the Results in Form EC8B in the IREV Portal) lacked probative value because Political Party Agents did not sign or counter sign any alterations therein. That reasoning of the Court was undoubtedly based on the misconception that the
“IREV is not part of collation… it is manifestly wrong for the 3″ Respondent to use figures or result from IREV in computing the Result for the Gubernatorial Election.”

In my considered view, that finding is misconceived and utterly perverse.
In the circumstances, both issues 1 & 2 of the Appellant ought to be, and are hereby resolved in favour of the Appellant.

ISSUE NO. 3

The issue 3 raises the question of whether despite the 1* and 2a Respondents failure to appeal against the decision of the Tribunal that the margin of lead principle relates to the total number of voters who collected voters’ cards in the Polling Units, the Court below was right to have dismissed the Appellant’s motion on Notice, dated 19/10/2023 and filed on 20/10/2023 (Grounds 6 and 7).
Instructively, the 1st and 2d Respondent’s raised the question of margin lead principle in paragraphs 47, 48, 50-60, of the petition and predicated same on number of registered voters.
(Pages 24-45 volume I of the Record). Most particularly, the pw1 in paragraph 59 of the Witness statement on oath deposed.

59. I know that the number of registered voters in polling units where there is over voting, where election was not conducted and where voters were not accredited is 12,137 far above the margin of lead between the ist Respondent and the 1st Petitioner.
In that regard, the Tribunal held:

On margin of lead principal clauses 57, 61 and 62 of the Regulations and Guidelines relates. to total number of voters who collected their permanent voter’s eard in the potting unit» arfected by over voting. Petitioners’ witnesses under cross examination stated that they did not know the number of registered voters that have collected their PVC. Besides, petitioners’ pleadings/evidence is deficient in this regard.
See page 2144 volume 3 of the Records.

Having critically considered the 1% Respondents appeal as a whole the Appellant deemed it expedient to challenge Grounds 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Notice of Appeal vis-a-vis issues
3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 distilled there from. At pages 2187-2197 of volume 3 of the court below held:
I have examined the grounds of appeal and I am satisfied that the margin of lead is in contention and it’s neither theoretical, hypothetical no (sic) academic. Consequently, the application of the 1% Respondent lacks merit and it is dismissed.

The Appellant has urged upon the court to hold, that the said Grounds 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the 15 and 2nd Respondent’s Notice of Appeal and the issues 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 distilled therefrom should be struck out for being incompetent.

24|
The 15 and 2nd Respondent’s brief (paragraphs 5.14-5.18 pages 17-19 of the brief) relate to the Appellant’s extant issue 3.

I agree with the 1$ and 2nd Respondent’s submission, to the effect that the Respondents have clearly stated their grounds of appeal and the fact that they were challenging the entire judgment of the trial Tribunal. Thus, the Appellant’s motion in question was rightly dismissed by the court below.
Moreover, the two authorities of PLATEAU STATE VS. AG FEDERATION (2006) 3 NWLR (pt. 967) 346; ODEDO VS. INEC
(2008) 17 NWLR (pt. 1117) 554, do not specifically relate to the issue.
Indeed, the significance of a ground of appeal is to define the Appellant’s grouse against the decision of the court below.

Thus, once the Appellant’s complaint is clear and unambiguous, thereby leaving no room for surprises regarding the issue distilled therefrom, the ground of appeal ought to be deemed valid and competent. See WAYA VS. AKAA (2023) 10 NWLR (pt. 1893) 537 @554 paragraphs B-D; DAGACI OF DERE VS. DAGACI OF EBUWA
(2006) 7 NWLR (pt. 979) 382; EHINLAWO VS. ONE (2008) 16
NWLR (pt. 1113) 357, 25 hereby resolved against the Appellant.

In the circumstances, issue 3 ought to be, and Same is

ISSUE NO. 4
The issue 4 raises the question of whether the Court below was right to grant both the substantive and alternative reliefs in the petition. The issue 4 is distilled from Ground 10 of the Notice of Appeal.
The law is settled, that when reliefs are sought in the alternative (as in the present case), the main relief should be considered and determined first. Where a party sets up two or more inconsistent sets of material facts, and claims reliefs in each of them in the alternative, he should be granted such relief as the set of facts he established would entitle him to. Where the first and principal elief is exhaustive of his remedy, there would be no need to onsider the alternative relief. See MR. CAROLINE MAERSK VS.
KOY INVESTMENTS LTD (2002) 12 NWLR (pt. 782) 472 @ 508-paragraphs H-E; GIDIGBI VS. AGIDIGBI (1996) 6NWLR (pt. ) 300 @ 313; MAJOR NICKSON STANLEY DONG VS. AG VAWA STATE (2014) LPELR-22217 (SC) per K.M.O. Kekere-JSC @ 31-32 paragraphs E-A.

In the circumstances, there’s every cogent reason for me to uphold the Appellant’s contention, that the Court below has ere in law when it granted the two sets af alternative reliefs sought Appellant by the If 1st and 2™ Respondents. Trust, the same 4 ought to be. and same is hereby resolved in favor of the Appellant.

ISSUE NO. 5

The issue 5 raises the question of whether the Court below was right when it lied on section 137 of the Electoral AB, 2022 and thereby held that the evidence of PWI-PMIS is not hearsay. and that the said evidence was linked to specific aspects of the 1 and 2nd aspects Respondent’s case. The issue 5 is predicated Notice upon
Grounds 9 and 14 of the Notice of Appeal

ISSUE NO. 8
The issue 8 raises the question of whether having found that Exhibit P182C was not legible, the court below was right to rely on section 137 of the Eectoral Act, 2022 to hold that the said Exhibit P182C showed non-compliance. The issue 8 is distilled from Ground 15 af the Notice of Appeal.

Both issues 5 and 8 correlate on the question of applicability af section 137 af the Electoral Act, 2022, thus ought to be determined together.

27 The 15t and 2d Respondents have notably raised the allegations of polling unit infractions in the various paragraphs of
the petition:
(a) Non-holding of election paragraphs 51, 52 and 53 of the petitions (pages 22-34 volume I Record);
(b) Over-voting paragraph 58 (pages 34-4 vol. I Record);
(c) Non-accreditation in many polling units – (paragraph 59 volume I Record);
(d) Alteration of Forms EC8A in many polling units without counter signing – (paragraph 61 of the petition (page 62 volume I Record).

The 15 and 2d Respondents equally claimed to have deployed their Polling Unit Agents in every polling unit. Regrettably, however, they failed to call the said Polling Unit Agents to testify.

Instead, they fielded PW1 (a Supervisory Collation Agent); (II) PW2 – (a State Collation Agent); (iii) PW3- (Maru Local Government Area Collation Agent); (iv) PW4- (Anka Local Government Area Collation Agent); (v) PW5-(Kaura Namoda LGA Collation Agent); (vi) PW6-(Zurmi Local Government Area 28 Collation Agent); (vii) PW7-(Maradu Local Government Area Collation Agent); (vili) PW8 – (Damaga/Damagiwa Ward Collation Agent); (ix) PW9-(Faru Magani Ward collation Agent); (x) PW10-(Gora Ward Collation Agent); (xi) PW11-(Jambako Ward Collation Agent); (xii) PW12-(Birnin Magaji Local Government Area Collation Agent); (xiii) PW13-(Bukkuyum Local Government Area Collation Agent); (xiv) PW14-(Bungudu Local Government Area Collation Agent); (xvi) PW16- (Talata Mafara Local Government Area Collation Agent); (xvii) PW17 A Supervisory Collation Agent; (xviii) PW18-(Gummi Local Government Area Collation Agent).

Not surprisingly, the foregoing witnesses admitted under cross-examination that they were not at any of the polling units during the election. It is equally in evidence, that none of the said 17 witnesses of the petitioners served as a polling unit agent during the election. Undoubtedly, their respective evidence was hearsay and inadmissible by virtue of sections 37 and 38 of the Evidence, Act, 2011.

The PW1, in particular testified on 07/07/2023. He adopted his statement on oath (page 1874 volume 3 of the Record). The bundles of documents tendered were admitted and marked as
Exhibits. The pw17 equally testified on 11/07/2023. He identified 29| bundles of documents that were admitted and marked as Exhibits.

I agree with the Appellant’s submission, that what the PW1 and PW17 did in the instant case, was to merely dump the bundles of the documents (Exhibits) upon the Tribunal. They failed to take any appropriate steps to relate the Exhibits to the part of the case. The Exhibits were not linked to any specific area of the 15 and 2″ Respondents’ case e.g over-voting, alteration of Form ECSA without counter-signing, non-holding of election and cancellation of elections, non-accreditation, margin of lead, et al.

Undoubtedly, against the background of the obvious shortcoming inherent in the 1st and 2d Respondents’ case, the provision of section 137 of the Electoral Act, 2022 could not, by any stretch of the imagination, absolve (relieve) them of the onerous burden of linking the Exhibits in question to the aspects of their case before the Tribunal (or Court as the case may be).

Invariably, the provision of section 137 of the Electoral Act,
the 2022 is to the effect:

137. It shall not be necessary for a party who alleges non-compliance with the provisions of this Act for the conduct of elections to call for 30 oral evidence if originals or certified true copies manifestly disclose the non-compliance alleged.

Indeed, the current position of the law is well settled, that the provision of section 137 of the Electoral Act, 2022 can only be invoked when the exhibits or documents tendered and relied upon manifestly disclose non-compliance with the Act.

This fundamental point was settled, not too long ago by this court in a plethora of formidable authorities, including OYETOLA VS. INEC (2023) 11 NWLR (pt. 1894) 125; (2023) LPELR
– 60392 (SC), wherein it was aptly held:

It is indubitable that section 137 of the Electoral Act, 2022 only applied where the noncompliance is manifest from the originals or certified true copies of documents relied on. In the instant case, neither Exhibit BVR nor any other document relied on by the Appellants remotely disclosed non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act. Hence, the section can not ne of any assistance to them. In the circumstance, they still had a duty to call witnesses who witnessed the alleged acts of non-compliance to testify. 31
per Agim, JSC. See also ATIKU VS. INEC (2003)

Indeed, in the most recent case of ATIKU VS. INEC (2023) supra, this Court deemed it expedient to reiterate the now trite law, that the provision of section 137 of the Electoral Act, 2022 cherishingly called a game changer; has not absolved a petitioner of the need to lead credible evidence to prove the alteration of non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act. Although the provisions of section 137 of the Act, clearly and unequivocally States that it shall not be necessary for a party to call for oral evidence if originals or certified true copies manifestly disclose the non-compliance, yet where documents are tendered in evidence, the petition must establish that the documents manifestly disclose the non-compliance.

In the instant case, the documents (Exhibits) in question were literally dumped upon the Tribunal. The Court below wa therefore, wrong in law when it held that the , PW1 and PW1 linked the said documents tendered to every aspect of the no compliance with the Electoral Act. 32
In the circumstances, the issues 5 and 8 ought to be, and are both hereby resolved in favor of the Appellant.

ISSUE NO. 9

The issue 9 raises the question of whether there was any pleading and proof that Exhibit R12C was mutilated, to justify the decision of the court below that it lacked probative value.

The issue 9 is predicated upon Ground 12 of the Notice of Appeal.
The finding of the Court below (at page 2370 volume 4 of the Record), thereby prompting the issue is to the effect:

Exhibit R12C which is the document relied upon by INEC to declare the result of Maradun Local Government in favour of 1st and 2d Respondents is equally mutilated. The Tribunal ought have examined the documents and we as Appellate court the law empowers us to evaluate evidence when the trial court fails to do so. See section 15 of the Courta  of Appeal Act, 2004.

It can be gleaned that Exhibit R12C lacks and  probative value political party agents did not sign the alteration there is non-counter signed appropriately, Multiple alterations without initialing erroneous computation amongst other  Coincidence which evidenced non-compliance with the Electoral Act is the conduct of the election are manifest.

However, notwithstanding the above finding, it’s obvious on the face of the Records, that the Court below did not actually set out to re-evaluate the evidence adduced by the respective parties at the trial. The court below, most regrettably, glossed over the evidence adduced at the trial which is abundantly obvious on the face of the records.
Instructively, the 15t and 2d Respondents did not plead in their petition that Exhibit R12C was mutilated and altered. What’s more, the pw19, the maker of Exhibit R12C testified regarding the said Exhibit. However, the 1st and 2″ Respondents did not confront him regarding Exhibit R12C being mutilated or altered.
cross-examination
The Court below, rather unwittingly, glossed over the testimony of PW19 (both examination-in-chief and under cross examination) at pages 1905-1910 of volume 3 of the Records. As aptly posited by the Appellant’s learned senior Counsel (paragraph 11.3 @ page 3 of Appellants’ brief):
Had the Court below taken time to study the proceedings as mentioned in the aforesaid pages of the Record, the Court below would  have affirmed the decision of the Tribunal attaching no probative weight to the said
Exhibit P182C.

I agree with that submission in its totality. As recounted here to fore, the said Exhibit P.182C is a duplicate copy of Forms EC8C for Maradun Local Government Area.

The maker of that exhibit was no other than the PW19 himself. Most ironically, the PW19 who made Exhibit P.182C deemed it expedient to discredit the same not only because of the questionable scores inserted therein, but also due to the obvious fact that the Exhibit in question was not readable at all! . Thus, consequent upon the PW19’s testimony thereby discrediting the authenticity of Exhibit P.182C, the Tribunal deemed it imperative in the exercise of its discretion to decline to attach any probative value thereto. See pages 2132 and 2135 of the volume 3 of the Records.

In the circumstances, issue 9 ought to be and same is hereby resolved in favor of the Appellant.

ISSUE NO. 10

The issue 10 raises the question of whether the Court below was right, to hold that the order of the Tribunal striking out paragraphs 24, 52, 59 and 61 of the petitions was erroneous. The said issue 10 is distilled from Ground 16 of the Notice of Appeal.
in question
It was alleged by the Appellant at the Tribunal, that the 15t and 2d Respondents had virtually abandoned paragraphs 24, 52-59 and 61 of their petitions, and thereby failed to adduce evidence in support of those paragraphs (pages 1518-1519 volume 2, Records). The 1st and 2d Respondents conceded to the Appellant’s contention regarding the abandonment of the pleadings in the paragraphs in question. The Tribunal, in the course of the vexed judgment, accordingly struck out the 15 and 2d Respondents’ abandoned paragraphs ,. See pages 2119-2120 volume 3 of the Records.

However, the Court below in its wisdom came to the conclusion that the striking out of the said paragraphs by the Tribunal was erroneous. See page 2361 volume 4 of the Records.
There is no doubt, as depicted by the Records, that none of the 19 witnesses called by the 1st and 2 Respondents testified under listed regarding the averments in paragraphs 52-59 and 61 of the Petition. The 1st and 2d Respondents failed to call the under listed witness whose statements on oath were frontloaded.
The law is indeed settled, that where witnesses are not called to prove some vital aspects of the pleadings, that part of the pleading ought to be deemed abandoned. See AREGBESOLA VS. OYENLOLA (2011) 9 NWLR (pt. 1253) 458 et al.

In the circumstances, the issue 10 is hereby resolved in favour of the Appellant.

Hence, having effectively resolved the foregoing issues 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 in favour of the Appellant, the appeal grossly succeeds. Thus, against the backdrop of the foregoing reasoning, I am in full concurrence with the reasoning and conclusion reached in the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, the Hon. Justice Emmanuel Akomaye Agim, JSC, to the effect that the present appeal ought to be, and same is hereby allowed by me.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal, delivered on 16/11/2023 in Appeal No. CA/S/EP/GOV/2M/21/2023, is hereby set aside. The judgment of the Zamfara State Election Tribunal, delivered on 18/9/2023 in Petition No. EPI/M/GOV/02/2023, thereby dismissing the petition of the Petitioners (15 and 2″* Respondents herein), is hereby restored.
No Order as to costs.

The decision in this Appeal effectively binds and determines
the sister Appeals (i) SC/CV/1166/2023; (ii) SC/CV/1167/2023; and (ili) SC/CV/1168/2023.
POST SCRIPT

It’s trite, that ever since the promulgation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, there has been the express vesting of Judicial powers in the courts both Federal and State. Under section 6 of the current constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (commencement May 5, 1999), it is expressly provided:
6. (1) The judicial powers of the Federal shall be vested in the courts to which this section relates being courts established for the Federation.

(2) The judicial powers of a state shall be vested in the courts to which this section relates, being courts established subject a provided by this constitution.
Most cherishingly, as a result of the vesting of express judicial powers in the courts under section 6 of the Constitution (supra), the hitherto stormy debate regarding the implication of the absence of those nowers in the court was brought to an end.

see ADEYEMI VS. AG OF OYO STATE (1984) 1SCNLR 525;
LIYANGE VS. R. (1967) AC 259; NWABUEZE B.O: IDEAS (SPECTRUM BOOKS LTD) 1993; SAGAY ILE THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA 1980-1988: NIGERIA LAW PUBLICATION 1988.
Interestingly, the most propounding feature distinguishing judicial powers from the Legislative and executive powers (sections 4 and 5 of the 1999 constitution), is the authority of the courts to determine between the conflicting parties, enforceable rights and obligation by a binding decision or order which disposes of the action in a dispute with absolute finality. As postulated by Oputa, JSC (of blessed memory), this judicial power as vested in the courts by the constitution is predicated fundamentally on the finality of judicial decisions, and in the expectation that the supposed finality of decision justice and fairness would ultimately prevail, and the constitutional mandate realised. See OPUTA, JSC: THE PLACE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE THIRD REPUBLIC (ALL NIGERIAN JUDGES CONFERENCE SERIES:
1988 @ 21).

Now, due to the fact that the fundamental object of law is social engineering, thereby formidably regulating relationships between people the law as enacted by the parliament must reflect cherished values of the society. Thus, the role of a judge (of whatever hierarchy must include an appreciation of the object (purpose) of law in society, thereby facilitating the attainment of justice. However, law sometimes may be proactive, thereby preceding societal changes or even stimulate same. In BROWN VS. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 347 US. 483 (1954), a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court, which overturned (set aside) the earlier rulings dating back to PLESSY VS. FURGUSON in 1896, by declaring that state laws which established separate public schools for black and white students, denied black children’s equal educational opportunities. By unanimous (decision-9-0), the apex Court held in no uncertain terms that:
“Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”

In consequence of that decision, de jure racial segregation was ruled a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Most cherishingly, this decision of the US apex court paved the way for integration and the Civil Rights Movements of the 1960s.

However, notwithstanding the far-reaching judicial powers accorded the Courts under section 6 of the 1999 Constitution 40 (supra), it ought to be appreciated that to whom much is given, much is expected. Thus, not surprisingly, the constitution nay the laws made pursuant thereto, require the judicial officers saddled with such enormous judicial powers on behalf of the general public to be ,, decent, responsible and hona est people. As once aptly remarked by Musdapha, JSC (as then was):

As Judges of the country’s courts, we must act according to the highest dictates of our conscience. We must be guided by the fundamental values and principles of constitutional democracy as well as values of simple decency, our integrity and that of the system we represent depends on it. Though a heavy responsibility rests on our civilized shoulders, we must remain steadfast.

Indeed, we must remain steadfast in the course of discharging our onerous and arduous responsibilities of dispensing justice to the people without fear or favour, affection or ill-will; despite all odds! We must remind ourselves always,
that:

Duty and veneration combine to give a pride of place to the Judiciary. I will not that which my conscience tells me is wrong, upon 41
this occasion to gain the huzahs of thousands or the daily praise of the papers which come from the press, I will not avoid doing what I think is right though it should draw on me the whole artillery of libels, all that falsehood and malice can invent or the credulity of a deluded populace can swallow. Once and for all let it be understood, that no endeavours of this kind will influence any man who at present sits here (on the bench). See R. VS. WILKES (1770) 4 BUS, 25-27 per Lord Mansfield, CJ@ 2527-2563.

Equally remarkable, was the speech of Willes, J. in EXPARTE FARNANDEZ, 10 CB (N.S) 3 @ 56:
I take leave to say that I am not conscious of the vulgar desire to elevate myself or the court of which I may be a member, by grasping after pre-eminence which does not belong to me; and that I will endeavor to ever be valiant in preserving and handing down those powers to do justice and to maintain truth, which for common good, the law has entrusted to judges.

The eminent jurist of repute, the Hon. Justice Dahiru 1usdapha, JSC (as then was) passionately remarked:

As a judge, I do not aspire to power. I do not seek to rule. I am aware of the chains that bind me as a judge. It endeavorsmust always be the rule of law and not the rule of the Judge. I view my office as a mission and not just a job. I hope adherence to these ideals would ensure that I would make a positive difference in my society.
I hope that history remembers me kindly long after I am gone.
All this I do by a deep conviction that as I sit at trial, I stand on trial.
And so, it is for us all.
See Musdapha, JSC (as then was) TOWARDS STRENGTHENING
JUDICIAL INTEGRITY: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE (PROCEEDINGS OF 2007 ALL NIGERIA JUDGES CONFERENCE @ 37. There’s no gain saying the fact, that all the foregoing remarks
of the foremost eminent jurists are very much aptly relevant to the turbulent storms Nigeria as a country is currently passing through.

However, it’s my absolute belief, that as judges with absolute abiding faith in our maker, the Almighty God and the judicial Oaths to which we subscribed, we ought not to entertain any As a judge, I do not aspire to power. I do not seek to rule. I am aware of the chains that bind me as a judge. It must always be the rule of law and not the rule of the Judge. I view my office as a mission and not just a job. I hope adherence to these ideals would ensure that I would make a positive difference in my society.

I hope that history remembers me kindly long after I am gone. All this I do by a deep conviction that as I sit at trial, I stand on trial.
And so, it is for us all.

See Musdapha, JSC (as then was) TOWARDS STRENGTHENING
JUDICIAL
INTEGRITY: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE
(PROCEEDINGS OF 2007 ALL NIGERIA JUDGES CONFERENCE @
37. There’s no gain saying the fact, that all the foregoing remarks
of the foremost eminent jurists are very much aptly relevant to the turbulent storms Nigeria as a country is currently passing through.
However, it’s my absolute belief, that as judges with absolute abiding faith in our maker, the Almighty God and the judicial Oaths to which we subscribed, we ought not to entertain any My quip about Public Policy brought me a birthday card from students at the University of Toronto, It, shows a horse and rider leaping over a fence, obstruction to justice. The horse has a streamer on his tail, ‘Public Policy’. The rider is a judge, in joyous mood and full control, with wings and grown flying. Inside it says:
Happy birthday. We hope you’re not saddle-sore.
See Lord Denning: THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW, OXFORD UNIVERSITY
PRESS, 2017 @ 172-173.

There used to be this very popular Latin Maxim: INTER ARMA ENIAT-SILENT LEGES; which literally translates as for laws are silent when arms are raised; or in times of war, the law falls silent! However, Cicero vehemently disagreed.
 
He argued, that the law very wisely, and in a manner silently, gives a man a right to defend himself… a plotter against one may be lawfully slain! A justification for self-defense in criminal trial.
See REMILLER And Another Vs. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION (2017) UK SC 5 (2018) AC.
PURT
URT
IRT
RT

One of the foremost formidable authorities on the point was the notorious case of LIVERSIDGE VS. ANDERSON (1942) AC 206, 45

wherein Lord Atkin (in his immutable dissenting speech) remarked:
“In this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent: they may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace.”
Per Lord Atkin244.

According to Lord Denning, MR, those remarks were made by Lord Atkin during the second world war – “the time of the flying bombs”.

But when I was appointed a judge, it was the time of the flying bombs. On one occasion in the basement after lunch, two witnesses turned up to give evidence, their faces cut by splinters from the bombs. One morning, I got to my room in the courts and found the windows
blasted and broken glass everywhere. At home back in Chukfield we were in the flight path of enemy bombers. They dropped their unused bombs on us. One afternoon, we had a grandstand view of the first flying bomb shot down by a spitfire. We carried on as usual of course. As Lord Atkin said in Liversidge v.
Aderson.

In this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent: they may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace.

Flat Iustitia et pereat Mundus is a Latin maxim denoting ‘let justice be done, though the heavens (world) would fall’. The genesis of this maxim is traceable to the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand I (1556-1554), who popularised it as a slogan to control the Roman Empire. An alternative phrase is Fiat justitia ruat cealum: meaning justice be done, though the heavens may fall’

In May 1772, lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench in England, in the case of James Somerset, a Virginia slave (in the USA) who claimed his freedom under English
common law. Lord Mansfield held:

The state of slavery is such, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political; but only positive law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and the time itself from whence it was created, is erased from memory: it’s so odious,

that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law… if the parties will have judgment, fiat justitia, ruat coelum – let justice be done, though the heavens may fall’.
See SOMER-SET VS. STEWART, I LOFFT I, 1, 98 ENG REP. @ 499 (KB 177); SMITH VS. GOULD (1706) QB ENG. REP. @ 338.

Arguably, the decision of Lord Mansfield CJ in SOMER-SET VS. STEWART (1773) supra, had considerable impact on the American Revolution. Historically, there was one particular Tea co Party that cherishingly stood out not necessarily for its refined charm and ambiance, but for the revolutionary fervor that bubbled within its cauldron-the Boston Tea Party of 1773. It was no ordinary gathering, but a watershed moment in the struggle for American independence.
COl
n
Onin  one December night in Boston Harbour, 1773, the Sons of Liberty disguised themselves as Mohawk warriors descended upon the Dartmouth, the Eleanor, and the Beavera three British ships laden with the detested tea. The rebels methodically emptied 342 chests of tea into the harbor, thereby unleashing a torrent of rebellion against the oppressive British Monarchy. Thus, the famous Boston Tea Party s been aptly characterised as: 48
[A] symbolic act of resistance, a declaration that the colonist would not bow to unjust taxation. As the tea mingled with the saltwater of Boston Harbor, it birthed a potent concoction of freedom and defiance. The ripples from this unconventional tea party reached far beyond the shores of Massachusetts, inspiring, a nation to stand up for its rights and brew a new chapter in the history of liberty.
Undoubtedly, the Boston Tea party 1773 immensely contributed to the push for Independence of the God’s own Country (the United States of America).
Indeed, a word is enough for the wise!

IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA
JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT

APPEARANCES:
D.D. Dodo SAN, Pius Akubo SAN, Chief Solomon Akuma SAN with Samson Eigege Esq. and Reuben Kinya Esq, for the Appellant.

Dr. Onyechi Ikpeazu SAN, Akinlolu Kehinde SAN, Usman O Sule SAN, Prof. T.B. Maiyaki SAN with Dr. Obinna Onya Esq. for the 18* and 2’d Respondents.
Ishaka M. Dokko SAN, Yahaya D. Dangana SAN with Dr.
Victoria Nyemigbo Esq., Wilson E. Tingir Esq. and Basil T. Hemba Esq. for the 3d Respondent.
A. K. Ajibade SAN, O.M. Atoyebi SAN with M.S. Afolagbe Esq Douglas Onclor Esq. and T.D. Mogbor for the 4th Respondent.