JUDGEMENT DELIVERED BY  EMMANUEL MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, JSC IN SC/CV/1152/2023

SC/CV/1152/2023

JUDGMENT
(Delivered by MOHAMM

ED LA WAL GARBA, JSC)Appellant; sponsored by the Labor Party, and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents; sponsored by the 4″‘ Respondent; All Progressives congress(APC), as candidates, participated in the Governorship conducted by the 1″ Respondent on the 18″ March, 2023 for ate. At the end of the election, the 2″d Respondent who I the 3″ Respondent as Deputy Governorship candidate, was id returned as the winner who scored the highest majority

Votes cast and satisfied the constitutional requirements for the election to the office of Governor. The Appellant came second (2d) in the election and being aggrieved with the declaration and return of the 2” Respondent, filed an election petition against same before the Lagos State Governorship Election Tribunal (Tribunal) – on the 9′” of April, 2023. As shown at page 9 of the Petition, it was predicated on three (3) grounds as follows:-

“i) The 2″‘ Respondent was, at the time of Election, not qualified
to contest the election.
(ii) The election of the 2′ Respondent was invalid by reason of corrupt practices or non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act 2022 and Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.
(ii) The 2″ Respondent was not duly elected by majority of the
lawful votes cast at the Election.”
In the course of the trial and after calling evidence in respect of all the grounds of the petition, grounds (ii) and (iii) were abandoned and struck out thereby leaving the ground i) as the sole and only ground upon which the petition was prosecuted by the Appellant.
In paragraphs 29 – 32 of the petition, particulars of facts in support of the sole ground were set out and are in brief, to the effect that the 2″d Respondent was, at the time of the election, not qualified to contest the election for nominating the 3rd Respondent as the Deputy Governorship candidate, who at the material time, had renounced his allegiance to the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as a citizen and had taken deliberate step of naturalizing as a citizen of the United States of America (USA), contrary to the combined provisions of Sections 182(1) (a) and 187 (1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution (As altered).

In proof of all the initial grounds of the petition, the Appellant called ten (10) witnesses and tendered some documents from the Bar as Exhibits. However, only the evidence of PW8; Olubusayo Fasidi, and the Exhibits PE 985 – 989 & PE 990 – 1033, tendered through her, related to the sole ground relied on ultimately, by the Appellant.
At the conclusion of the trial, the Tribunal, in a judgment delivered on the 25″ September, 2023, dismissed the petition for failure to prove the facts of the disqualification of the 2″d and 3rd Respondents to
contest the election in question.

The Appellant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal, Lagos Division (court
below), was dismissed and the decision by the Tribunal affirmed in. the judgment delivered on the 15* November, 2023.
Again, being aggrieved by that decision, the Appellant brought this appeal vide the Notice and Grounds. of Appeal filed on the 26h November, 2023, containing fourteen (14) grounds.

In line with the requirements of Rules of practice in the Court, briefs of argument were filed by the Learned Counsel for the parties in • support of their respective positions in the appeal, thus:-
1. Appellant’s Brief was filed on the 5″ December, 2023.
2. The 15 Respondent’s Brief was filed on the 13th December, 2023.
3. The 2nd and 3″” Respondents’ Brief was filed on the 15hDecember, 2023.
4. The 4′”‘ Respondent’s Brief was filed on the 14″ December, 2023.
5. The Appellant’s Reply Briefs to all the Respondents’ Briefs were filed on 16 December, 2023.
At pages 2 – 3 of the Appellant’s Brief, the following sole issue is submitted for determination in the appeal:-

“2.01 WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEAL WAS RIGHT WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL TO THE EFFECT THAT 3RD RESPONDENT WHO WAS SPONSORED AS THE DEPUTY GOVERNOSHIP CANDIDATE OF THE 4™ RESPONDENT HAVING ACQUIRED THE CITIZENSHIP OF UNITED STATE OF AMERICA AND MADE A DECLARATION OF ALLEGIANCE HAS NOT RENDERED THE 2ND RESPONDENT, AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION DISQUALIFIED TO CONTEST IN THE LAGOS STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION HELD ON THE 18TH MARCH, 2023.

(Distilled from Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Notice of Appeal.”
For the 15 Respondent, two (2) issues were distilled for consideration by the court at page 4 of the 1″ Respondent’s Brief as follows:-
“i Whether having regard to the relevant statutes, and the subsisting case laws, the Lower Appellate Court was right in upholding the decision of the Lower Trial Tribunal
discountenancing the testimonies of PW7, PW8 and PW9, as well as the documents tendered through them? Grounds 1, 9, 10, 11 and 12.

8. Whether or not the Lower Appellate Court rightly held that the Appellant failed to establish that the 2″ and 3″ Respondents were not qualified and/or were disqualified from contesting the Logos State Gubernatorial Election of 18′” March, 2023?
   Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.”

Two (2) issues are also submitted for determination in the appeal at page 6 of the 2″ and 3′ Respondents’ Briefs in the following terms:-

“In view of the state of pleadings and evidence before the trial tribunal viz-a-viz relevant and applicable provisions of the Constitution; whether the lower court was not right when it affirmed it affirmed the decision of the trial tribunal that the Appellant (as petitioner) did not prove his case to warrant a disqualification of the 3rd Respondent? (Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12).

Was the lower court not right to have dismissed the Appellant’s Motion on Notice dated and filed 31″ October, 2023 seeking to strike out the Respondents’ brief of argument before the lower court? (Grounds 13 and 14).”

The single issue formulated by the Appellant is adopted at page 9 of the 4″ Respondent’s Brief.

Before a consideration of the arguments, on the germane issue/s that
call for decision in the appeal, I note that the 2″d and 3″‘ Respondents have filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection (NPO) on the 15th December, 2023 to question the jurisdiction of the court and/or competence of the appeal and seek for striking out/dismissal of the entire appeal, among other orders the court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The Notice of Preliminary Objection is argued at pages 4 – 6 of the 2″* and 3″d Respondents’ brief.

The Notice of Preliminary Objection is premised on the grounds that:-
“I. The judgment of the lower court appealed against by the Appellant is rooted in concurrent findings of the two lower courts.

There is/are no allegations) of perversity of the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts in any of the grounds contained in Appellants’ Notice of Appeal filed on 26″. November, 2023.

iii. Further to i) and ii) supra, the jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court to determine the appeal before it has not been invoked.

1. The appellate jurisdiction of this Honorable Court in election matters is limited to appeals from the decision of the lower court.
   v. Appellant is not seeking any relief for the setting aside of the judgment of the lower court.
   vi. Appellant’s central relief in his Notice of Appeal is incompetent. vi. Further to (i-vi) above, the entire appeal is academic and cannot
   activate the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.

It is the interest of justice for this Honorable Court to grant this application.”
List of the Authorities cited in the 2″d and 3″” Respondents’ Brief was also filed along with Notice of Preliminary Objection.

The 4″ Respondent filed a motion on notice to question the grounds 1, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the Notice of Appeal for failure by the Appellant to formulate any legally cognizable issue from them and so are said to be deemed abandoned. The objection is argued at pages 3 – 9 of the 4″ Respondent’s Brief.

The arguments of the 2d and 3 Respondent on their notice of preliminary objection are to the effect that the Appellant has not, on the Notice of Appeal, alleged or challenged that the concurrent findings of the two (2) lower courts are perverse to clothe the court with the jurisdiction to intervene in the appeal, on the authority of AliV. State (2021) 12 NWLR (pt. 789) 159 at 198 and Almajir v. Jalbait Ventures Nig. Ltd. (2021) 15 NWLR (pt. 1798) 157 at 174. Also, that the appeal is academic as the Appellant did not seek any relief on the Notice of Appeal which defines the jurisdiction of the court as one of the determinant and Uzoukwu v. Ezeonu II (1991). 8 NWLR (pt. 200)
709 at 730, Fayemi v. Onu (2010) 17 NWLR (pt. 1222) 326 at 404 – 405 and Oguntoyinbo v. Oguntayinbo (2000) 2 NWLR (pt. 464) 585 are cited for the submission and the Notice of Appeal is said to be incompetent and we are urged to strike out or dismiss the appeal.

In the Appellant’s Reply Brief to the 2″ and 3′ Respondents’ Brief, it submitted that the Notice Preliminary Objection is grossly Misconceived since the jurisdiction of the court is statutorily conferred, by the authority of Musa v. Umar (2020) 11 NWLR (pt.
1735)213 at 243 and that the Notice of Appeal has disclosed how the concurrent findings of the two (2) lower court have occasioned a miscarriage of justice. It is also the case of the Appellant that the reliefs sought on the Notice of Appeal are competent and the court is urged to discountenance the objection.

Resolution:

Without the need to waste verbiage on the objection, I should jus state that the substance of the appeal as contained in the grounds on the Notice of Appeal challenges and questions the interpretation and application of the provisions of Sections 182(1) (a) and 187(1) and (2) of the Constitution to facts which are not in dispute, by the two (2) lower courts and are valid grounds which do not strictly question concurrent findings of facts by those courts. The reliefs sought on the Notice of Appeal, though appear at large, seek reversal of the decision
by the Court of Appeal which affirmed the decision of the Tribunal
that the Appellant failed to prove the disqualification under section
182 (1) (a) and 187 (1) and (2) of the Constitution: The relief leaves the 2″d 3′ Respondents in no doubt about its purport or about the court’s jurisdiction over same. For these reasons, the Notice of Appeal is competent to validly and properly invoke the appellate* court jurisdiction of the court over the appeal. The objection is overruled and dismissed.

On the part of the 4″ Respondent, the objection is that the sole issue raised by the Appellant is not covered and cannot be accommodated by the fourteen (14) grounds of the appeal on the Notice of Appeal.

Specifically, it is argued that grounds 1, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 are abandoned as no issue was distilled from them.

In the Appellant’s Reply Brief to the 4 Respondent’s Brief and the Counter Affidavit filed on 16 December, 2023, it is contended that all the grounds of the appeal cover the sole issue formulated in the Appellant’s Brief on failure by the lower courts to hold that the
Appellant’s evidence has proved the disqualification of the 2nd and 3^rd Respondents.

Resolution:

I have perused the fourteen (14) grounds of appeal contained on the Notice of Appeal which appears at pages 3310 – 3327 of Vol. 6 of the Record of Appeal and note that though the grounds are verbose and SC/CV/1152/2023
repetitive, the complaints therein are quite clear enough to give the Respondents adequate notice of what the appeal is all about. Grounds 2 – 12 deal with the complaint of the disqualification of the 21d and 3rd Respondents which is reflected in the sole issue raised by the Appellant.

However, no issue was raised or distilled from the ground 1 while the sole issue of the Appellant is not derivable from or traceable to• grounds 13 and 14 which complain about the number of pages of the 2nd and 3d Respondent’ Brief before the court below. The consequence is that grounds 1, 13 and 14 are deemed abandoned since no cognizable issue in law has been distilled from them and are liable to be struck out.
They are and so the 4″ Respondent’s objection/motion succeeds in that part and fails in respect of grounds 2 – 12 of the Notice of Appeal.

The above positions of the law on the objections raised by the 2nd, 3^rd and 4″  Respondents are common place in the superior courts and do not require citation of authorities in support since they are trite.

With the objections out of the way, I now proceed to consider the arguments on the issue submitted for decision by the parties in the appeal. Perhaps, I should state that since the sole issue raised by the
Appellant represents the real complaint against the decision of the Court of Appeal as reflected in grounds 2 – 12 of the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, it should be the platform for the determination of the merit of the appeal.
The pith of the issue presented for determination by the Appellant can simply be put thus:-

Whether the Court of Appeal is’ right to affirm the decision of the Tribunal that the Appellant did not prove the sole ground of the petition on the disqualification of the 2’d and 3’d Respondents under the provisions of Sections182(1) (a) and 187(1) and (2) of the Constitution. Since the court is empowered and at liberty to reformulate and resolve issues in an appeal that circumscribe the real question in controversy; see Labiyi v. Arentiola (1992) 8 NWLR (pt. 258) 39 (SC), Nzekwe v. Anaekwenegbu (1991) 8 NWLR (pt. 16740 235 (SC), Abdullahi v. Adetutu (2020). 3 NWLR (pt. 1711) 338 (SC), I intend to use this simple formulation in determination of the appeal.

Appellant’s Submission:

The submissions, though made in round and-about manner, are to the effect that the evidence of the Appellant, the statement on oath of PW8 and Exhibits PE 393 – PE 404, PE 713 PE 723 as well as the evidence elicited under cross-examination of PW 1, and PW2, established that the 3a Respondent had voluntarily acquired the citizenship of the USA and made a declaration of allegiance to that – country. It is argued that the Tribunal was wrong to have held that since the 3rd
• Respondent is a citizen of Nigeria by birth, his subscription to an oath or declaration of allegiance to the USA cannot and does not strip him of his citizenship when the case of the Appellant was that such a declaration has disqualified the 2″ and 3^rd Respondents from contesting the election in question by virtue of the provisions of Section 182(1) (a) and 187(1) and (2) of the Constitution. It was pointed out that the Tribunal had earlier found,• as a fact, that the 3″ Respondent had indeed acquired citizenship of
the USA and made a declaration of allegiance as a precursor to • becoming a naturalized citizen of that country.

The court below is said to have erroneously omitted to consider the relevant evidence elicited by the Appellant under cross-examination. of RW1 and RW2 which supported his case, as stated in Akomolefe v. Guardian Press Ltd. (2010) LPELR – 366 and was wrong to have . held that the Appellant did not produce documentary and concrete evidence to prove his case. Reference were made to several portions of the judgments by the lower courts on the proof and findings that the. 3* Respondent acquired citizenship of the USA and made a declaration of allegiance to that country: In further argument, it is said that the Court of Appeal erred’ to have stated that the Exhibits PE – 393 – PE 404 and PE 713 – PE 723 which were all tendered from the Bar, were struck out when the said Exhibits were never struck out by the Tribunal and also failed to consider the Exhibits R42 – R45 put in evidence by. the 2″ and 3rd Respondents that confirms the 3d Respondent acquired the citizenship of the USA in 2002.

It is the case of the Appellant that the law does not require him to produce the Oath of allegiance subscribed to by the 3″‘ Respondent or any other document in order to prove the ground of the petition, citing • Ajanaku v. Osuma (2013) LPELR – 20528 (CA) in support of the  submission. Akomolafe v. Guardian Press Ltd. (supra) and Ayoola v. Yahya (2004) LPELR – 5889 (CA) are referred to on the requirements on proof of declaratory reliefs which the court below is accused of wrongly applying in the Appellant’s case. The Learned SAN for the Appellant then contends that renunciation of citizenship under Section 29 of the Constitution is not a condition precedent to the success of the ground of the petition, as erroneously held by the court below, since the provisions of Sections 182(1) (a) and 187(1) and (2) of the Constitution do not contain such requirement and it cannot be imported into the provisions. According to him, when read with Section 177 of the Constitution, these Sections provide that a citizen of Nigeria by birth who voluntarily acquires the citizenship of another country or who makes a declaration of allegiance to another country is disqualified, but this citizenship by birth is preserved under Section 28of the same Constitution. Sections 177, 182(1) (a) and .
187(1) and (2) of the Constitution were set out and it is argued that the requirement of proof of renunciation of citizenship by the court below constitutes judicial legislation, which it lacks the jurisdiction to embark on, on the authority of Adeokin Records & Anor. V. Musical Copyright Society of Nigeria (Lia/GTE) (2018) LPELR – 45300 (SC), Jegede v. INEC (2021) LPELR – 55481 (SC), Action Congress V. INEC (2007) All FWLR (pt. 378) 1012 at 1088 – 1089 and NNPC v. Lutin Inv. Ltd. (2006) 1 SC (pt. III) 49, (2006) LPELR – 2024 (SC).

It is maintained that Section 177 (a) specifically mentions a citizen of Nigeria by birth as a qualifying condition and so it follows that the disqualifying disabilities set out in Section 182(1), (a) relate to only those who are citizens by birth by the use of the word “or” to categorize two (2) sets of citizens disqualified as:-
(1) A citizen by birth who acquires the citizenship of another country and
(ії) A citizen by birth who makes a declaration of allegiance to another country.
The case of Marwa v. Nyako (2012) LPELR – 7837 (SC) is sited on principle of interpretation of clear provisions of a statute/constitution and it is contended that citizenship by birth is not an immunity to the
disqualifying disabilities listed under Section 182(1) (a) of the Constitution otherwise, there would have been no need for the section or the framers would have said to.

It is also argued that Section 131, 137, 177(a), 182(1) (a) and 187(1) and (2) of the Constitution sought to jealously protect the sovereignty of the country from any foreign interference and therefore prohibit any individual who voluntarily pledged his or her loyalty, fidelity and allegiance to another country from occupying a sensitive position of a Governor or Deputy Governor of State or President or Vice President
of Nigeria. The court below is said to have wrongly relied on its earlier decisions in the case of Labour Party v. Isola (2014)LPELR – 24386 (CA), Ogbeide v. Osula (2004) 12 NWLR (pt. 886) 86 at 127 and Gboluga v. Hon. Acbert Akintoye (unreported) which occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the Appellant and the ground that the decisions are obiter dictum and the facts different from the Appellant’s case:

The court below is also accused of failure to consider and pronounce on the issues 3 and 5 raised and argued in the Appellant’s Brief contrary to the law stated in, among other cases, Longterm Global Capital Ltd. V. Stanbic IBTC Bank, Plc (2022) LPELR – 58907 (SC) and Honeywell Flour Mills, Pls, v. Eco Bank (2018) LPELR – 45127 SC/CV/1152/2023 (SC).

The court is invited to consider the said issues and urged, to resolve them in Appellant’s favor.
The Appellant also complaints that the court below was wrong in upholding the Tribunal’s decisions to discountenance the evidence of PW7, PW8 and PW9 and the documents tendered through them on the ground that they were not listed and the statements did not accompany the petition and were not demonstrated in court.
The court is invited to depart from its earlier decision in Appeal SC/CV/937)23; Obi v. INEC delivered on the 26 October, 2023 and to countenance the evidence of the said witnesses and the Exhibits to set aside the decision by the court below. Section 137 of Electoral Act, 2022 and Paragraph 46 (4) of the 15 Schedule to the Act are referred to in support of the invitation.

In the final analysis and conclusion, the court is urged to resolve the issue in Appellant’s favor, allow the appeal, set aside the decision by the court below and grant the reliefs 1, 2 and 3 of the petition.
1″ Respondent’s Submissions:-

Under its issue i), it is submitted for the 1″ Respondent that the lower courts are right and on sound legal footing when they discountenanced the evidence of PW7, PW8 and PW9 since it was in breach of the provisions in Section 285 (S) of the Constitution and” Paragraph 4(5) of the 1″ Schedule to the Electoral Act, on the authority of Oke v. Mimiko (No. 1) (2014) 1 NWLR (pt. 1388) 285.

Also, that the evidence did not prove the ground of the petition and that the Appellant’s right to fair hearing was not affected or breached by the application of the court’s decision in Obi v. INEC (supra) since the witnesses, had testified and the Appellant given unhindered opportunity to ventilate his case and that Sections 55, 218, 219 and 253 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to subterfuge in foisting an amendment of the Appellant’s petition after the expiration of the time prescribed for the presentation or filing of the petition. .
On issue 2, the arguments are to the effect that a community reading of Sections 182(1) (a) and 187(1) and (2) of the Constitution shows that the 3rd Respondent’s purported adoption of the citizenship of the
USA does not disqualify him and the 2″ Respondent from contesting the election in question as such adoption does not constitute a ground for losing Nigerian citizenship by birth for the purpose of Section 177 of the Constitution.

Relying on CPC v. INEC (2011) 18 NWLR (pt. 1279) 493, it is pointed out that the Appellant had the duty or burden to prove his case since his claims were declaratory in nature and the cases of Ladoja v. Ajimobi (2016) 10 NWLR (pt. 1519) 87 at 144-145 and Andrew v. INBC (2017) LPELR – 48518 (SC) are referred to on the principle of dumping of documents. It is also the case of the 1 Respondent that paragraph 46(4) of the 1s Schedule to the Electoral Act does not relieve a petitioner the burden of demonstrating documents relied on in proof of his case, as the admission of the documents would not ipso facto, translate into automatic probative value.

The court is prayed, in conclusion, to resolve the issue in favour of the 1st Respondent and dismiss the appeal. and 3″‘ Respondent’s Submissions:
It is argued that the Appellant did not challenge the ratio of the decision by the Tribunal to discountenance the evidence of PW7,
PW8 and PW9, which was affirmed by the court below, that the witnesses gave oral evidence in contravention of paragraph 41 (1) an (3) of the 1″ Schedule to the Electoral Act and so it is binding on the Appellant.

Reliance was placed on the case of Booßank, Ple v. Anchorage Leisures Ltd. (2018) 18 NWLR (pt. 1651) 201 at 221 for the – argument and it is further said that the Tribunal was right to have relied on the decision of the court below, in Obi v. INEC which was affirmed by this Court. It is the case of the 2nd and 3i Respondents that the Evidence Act does not provide for the frontloading of witnesses statements or depositions of a subpoenaed witness, but specifically provided for in the 18 Schedule to the Electoral Act as special and specific legislation for election petitions that are sui generis, citing ANPP v. Goni (2012) 7 NWLR (pt. 1298) 147 at 182.

Other arguments on the proof of disqualification of the 2’d and 3d
Respondents by the Appellant are substantially and materially the same as those made by the 1st Respondent and no purpose would be served for their petition here. It is maintained that the evidence adduced by the Appellant, on whom the burden of proof lies; vide Jime v. Ishaku (2019) LEPLR – 47752 (SC) at 79, did not prove the disqualification alleged since he did not produce credible evidence that the 3′ Respondent has voluntarily renounced his citizenship of Nigeria by birth pursuant to Section 29 of the Constitution. In further argument, it is said, relying on Oju v. Abdul-Rahim (2009) LPELR – 2596 (SC) at 49 – 50, that for being made subject to the provision of Section 28, the provisions of Section 182(1) (a) of the Constitution are inferior to, subordinate to, subservient to and subjugated to Section 28 such that any of the disqualifications in Section 182(1) (a) is subjected to the provisions in Section 28.

In addition, it is contended that the Appellant has attempted to change. his case here from the one presented in his pleadings challenging the citizenship of the 3d Respondent to one of subscribing to an oath of
allegiance as contained in grounds 3 – 7 of the Notice of Appeal and arguments at paragraphs 4.09 and 4.45 of the Appellant’s Brief, contrary to the law stated in Sulaiman.v. APC (2022) 5 NWLR (pt.
1877) 211 at 292. The court is urged to resolve the issue in favour of the 2″d and 3″‘ Respondents and to, in conclusion, dismiss the appeal.

The arguments on issue 2 of the 20d and 3″ Respondents relate to the incompetent grounds 13 and 14 of the Notice of Appeal which have been struck out earlier in this judgment.

4″ Respondent’s Submissions:-

It is submitted, on the authority of WHys v. Law (2019) UPELR – 47048 (CA) and Jime v. Ishaku (onprs), Mar the Appellant who sought – declaratory reliefs had the burden to prove the allegation made of disqualification of the 2W and 3″ Respondents.

Arguments similar to the ones preferred by the !” Respondent and the 2″d and 3 Respondents on the proof of the sole ground of the Appellant’s petition and his failure to discharge the burden, are made and in addition, the cases of Oyetola v. INEC (2023) 11 NWLR (1894) 125, Ucha v. Elechi (2012) 13 NWLR (pt. 1317) 330 at 359 and Gundiri v. Nyako (2014) 2 NWLR (pt. 1391) 211 at 246, are • referred to in support of the arguments.
The decision of this court in Appeal SC/CV/935/2023; Abubakar v. INEC, delivered on 26/10/2023 is referred to and relied on for the decision of the lower courts to expunge the evidence of PW7, PW8 and PW9 whose depositions on oath were not filed along with the Appellant’s petition, in addition to other cases on the point.
In conclusion, the court is urged to hold that the decision by the lower courts is correct and to dismiss the appeal with substantial costs.

Appellant’s Replies to the Respondents’ briefs, largely contain repetitions and further arguments of the points already canvassed in the Appellant’s Brief and not on any fresh of new point/s raised or arising in the Respondents’ briefs.

I have noticed recently, that in election appeals, in particular, counsel for Appellants embark on making wholesale responses to every or all points argued in the Respondents’, brief in reaction or answer to the ones canvassed in the Appellant’s brief without regard to whether the points are either new or fresh points of law which call for answers from the Appellants because they are outside the points or issues already canvassed in the Appellant’s Brief.

That is wrong, since the recognized and established purpose of a Reply brief in an appeal is only to answer, react or respond to any fresh of new point/s raised or arising from the Respondents’ brief
which require answers from the Appellant in order to clarify and ossify the real issues of law in controversy between the parties. 
Reply brief, once more, is not meant. for repeating arguments or offering further arguments on points or issues already canvassed extensively in the Appellant’s Brief in support of an appeal or to be SC/CV/1152/2023
used “as a repair kit” by an Appellant. See M.B.N. Pic. V. Nwobodo (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 379 (SC), Nioga v. Bagadam (2010) 3 NWLR (pt. 1182) 517, Abubakar v. Nasamu (No.2) (2012) 17 NWLR (pt. 1330) 538 (SC), Akande v. Adisa (2010) 15 NWLR (pt. 1324) 3538 (SC), Husseni v. Mohammed (2015) 3 NWLR (pt. 1445) 100 (SC), Ogbu v. State (2017) 8 NWLR (pt. 1595) 386 (SC), APC v. Karfi (2018) 6 NWLR (pt. 1616) 479 (SC), Abdulkadir v. Mohammed (2019) 12 NWLR (pt. 1687) 450 (SC), Ikala v. Udah (2019) 9 NWLR (pt. 1678) 562 (SC). In the above premises, the Appellant Reply Briefs to the Respondent’s briefs are liable to be discountenanced.

Resolution of the Issue;-

I should say that the issue has its roots and foundation on the interpretation and application of the provisions of Sections 177(a), 182(1) (a), 187 (187 (1) and (2) as well as Section 28 of the 1999 Constitution (as altered) on the qualification and disqualification for a person to contest election for the office of a Governor of a State in
Nigeria.

Now, for being the foundation of laws in the land, i.e. the ground norm, the courts, over the years, have evolved and consistently identified certain basic guiding principles for the construction or interpretation of the majesterial provisions of the Constitution. From the time of the decisions in Awolowo v. Shagari (1979) All NLR, 120, A.G., Bendel State v. A.G., Federation (1981) 10 SC, 1, (1981) 1 FNLR, 179, Ishola v. Ajiboye (1994) 6 NWLR (pt. 352), 506, (1994) 7 – 8 SCNJ (pt. 1) 1 at 34, Ompadec v. Ajoku (2001) 8 NWLR (pr. 715), Ilotie-Edoh v. Manager (2005) All FWIR (pt. 241) 277 (SC), Adetayo v. Ademola (2010) 15 NWLR (pt. 1215) 169 (SC), Oni v. Fayemi (2013) All FWLR (pt. 696) 451 (SC), James v. INEC (2015) 12 NWLR (pt. 1474) 538 (SC), Abegunde v. O.S.H.A. (2015) 12 NWLR (pt. 2015) 12 NWLR (pt. 1461) 314 (SC), Comp-Gen., Customs v.
Gusau (2017) 18 NWLR (pt. 1598) 353 (SC), Belo v. Yusuf (2019) 15 NWLR (pt. 1695) 250 (SC).

In the now famous case on constitutional interpretation of Marwa v. Nyako (2012) 6 NWLR (pt. 1296), 199, at 278 – 280, paragraph E – R, Onnoghen, JSC (later CJN) in the Lead Judgment of the full panel of this court restated that:-
“Over the years, the Supreme Court has deviced guidelines to the interpretation of not only statutes but most importantly our constitutional provisions, including the now famous twelve (12) point rule of constitutional interpretation propounded by Obaseki, JSC in the case of Attorney-General of Bendel Smate v.
Attorney-General of the Federation (1981) 10 SC 1; (1981) 1 FNLR 179; (1982) 3 NCLR 1 as follows:-

“(1) Effect should be given to every word used in the Constitution.
(2) A Constitution nullifying a specific clause in the Constitution shall not be tolerated, unless where absolutely necessary.
(3)A constitutional power should not be used to attain an unconstitutional result.
(4) The language of the Constitution, where clear and unambiguous must be given its plain and evident
(5)The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is an organic scheme of government to be dealt with as an entirely, hence, a particular provision should not be severed from the rest of the Constitution.
(6) While the language of the Constitution does not change, the changing circumstances of a progressive society for which it was designed, it can yield new and further import of its meaning.
(7) A constitutional provision should not be construed in such a way as to defeat its evident purpose.
(8) Under the Constitution granting specific powers, a particular power must be granted before it can be exercised.
(9) Declaration by the National Assembly of its essential legislative functions is precluded by the Constitution.
(10) Words are the common signs that men make use of to declare their intention one to another; and when the words of a man express his intentions plainly, there is no need to have recourse to other means of interpretation of such words.

(11) the principles upon which the constitution was established, rather than the direct operation or literal meaning of the  words used, should measure the purpose and scope of us provisions.
(12) Words of the Constitution are, therefore, will do be read with “stultifying narrowness”
Hoever, in Ishola v. Ajiboye (1994) 7-8 SCNJ (ph. D) l at 392 (1994) 6 NWLR (pt. 352) 506, Ogundere, SSC after adopting the twelve (12) point rule supra gave his own four (4) point rule as follows:-
1. Constitutional language is to be given e reasonable construction, and absurd consequences are as be avoided:

2. Constitutional provisions dealing with the same subject matter are to be construed together;
3. Seemingly conflicting parts are to be harmonized t possible, so that effect can be given to all parts of the Constitution.
4. The position of an article or clause in the Constitution influences its construction.

It is settled law that the object of interpreting statute or the Constitution, is to discover the intention of the legislature, which intention is usually deduced from the language used.

The golden rule of interpretation of constitutional provisions is therefore that words of the Constitution must, prima facie, be given their ordinary meaning which means”.

As can easily be discerned from the above principles, in the construction or interpretation of constitutional provisions, all the principles are applicable and none of them is to be totally discarded in
the effort to get to ascertain the intention of the Drafters of the provisions in the context and language used in the enactment.

Therefore, when interpreting constitutional provisions, the court is to bear in mind that it is dealing with an instrument which controls and regulates not only official powers and functions, but also provides for, protects and controls the rights and allegations of the citizens as well as peace and order of the society generally.

The provisions of Sections 177(á), 182(1) (a), 187(1) and (2) and 28 of the Constitution, the subject of interpretation or construction in this appeal, are in the following terms..
“177. A person shall be qualified for election to the office of Governor of a State if-
(a) he is a citizen of Nigeria by birth;”
“182. (1) No person shall be qualified for election to the office of Governor of a State if
(a) subject to the provisions of section 28 of this Constitution,
he has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a country other than Nigeria or, except in such cases as may be prescribed by the National Assembly, he has made a declaration of allegiance to such other country;
(2) where in respect of any person who has been
a. adjudged to be lunatic;
b.  declared to be of unsound mind;
c. sentenced to death or imprisonment; or

d. adjudged or declared bankrupt;

an appeal against the decision is pending in any court or law in accordance with any law in force in Nigeria, subsection (1) of this section shall not apply during a period beginning from the date when such appeal is lodged and ending on the date when the appeal is finally determined or, as the case may be, the appeal lapses or is abandoned, whichever is earlier.”

“187. (1) in any election to which the foregoing provisions of this part of this Chapter relate, a candidate for the office of Governor of a State shall not be deemed to have been validly nominated for such office unless he nominates another candidate as his associate for his running for the office of Governor, who is to occupy the office of Deputy Governor; and that candidate shall be deemed to have been duly elected to the office of Deputy Governor if the candidate who nominated him is duly elected as Governor in accordance with the said provisions;

(2) The provisions of this Part of this chapter” relating to qualification for election, tenure
office, disqualifications, declaration of assets and liabilities and Oath of Governor shall apply in relation to the office of the Deputy Governor as if references to references to Deputy Governor.”

“28. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this section, a person shall forfeit forthwith his Nigerian citizenship if, not being a citizen of Nigeria by birthi, he acquires or retains the citizenship or nationality of a country, other than Nigeria, or which he is not a citizen by birth.

(2) Any registration of a person as a citizen of Nigeria or the grant of a certificate of naturalization to a person who is a citizen of a country other than Nigeria at the time of such régistration or grant shall, if he is not a citizen by birth of that other country, be conditional upon effective renunciation of the citizenship or nationality of that other country within a period of not more that twelve months from the date of such registration or grant.”

Starting with the provisions of Section 177 (a), I dare say that they could not have been more simple, clear, unambiguous, plain, ordinary and straight forward in both words and language in expressing their purport.

The Heading of the section tells it all by stating the real intention or purpose for which the provisions are enacted and that is setting or spelling out the requirements or conditions to be met, satisfied or fulfilled for a person to be qualified to contest an election for the office of a Governor of a State in Nigeria. The provisions stipulate and speli out the conditions or requirements which precede and on which qualification to contest for the office of the Governor is totally. dependent predicated on that must be met, satisfied or fulfilled by a
person to be able to validly and constitutionally contest for that office.
See Emenike v. PDP (2012) 12 NWLR (pt. 1315) 556 (SC), Imam v.
Sheriff (2005) 4 NWLR (pt. 914) 80……..

In that regard, the provisions are, for being clear and unambiguous, to be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning without embellishments or garnishees, purposefully, liberally and holistically in line with the canons or principles of interpretation stated in the cases cited earlier.

In their plain and grammatical sense and meaning, the provisions of section 177(a) proclaim and decree that:-
“A person shall be qualified for election to the office of Governor if:-
(a) He is a citizen of Nigeria by birth.”

The use of the word “shall” in the provisions indicate and show that it is an exhortation and guarantee. See Agip Nig. Ltd. v. Agip Petroli Int. (2010) 5 NWLR (pt. 1187) 348 (SC); Ugwu v. Ararume (2007)
12 NWLR (pt. 1048) 365 at 411 – 412 (SC), Ugba v. Suswam (2013)All FWLR. (pt. 695) 268) SC).

Expressly, that a person who is a citizen of Nigeria by birth, is automatically, by that fact, inter alia, constitutionally qualified to contest for election to the office of Governor of a State in Nigeria.

In other words, once a person is a citizen of Nigeria by birth and remained so, and satisfied the requirements in paragraphs (b) and (C) . of Section 177 at the time of the election, he is constitutionally presumed and deemed to be qualified to contest election for the office of Governor of a State in Nigeria. A person who is a citizen of Nigeria by birth, has attained the age of thirty-five years, a member of a political party and is sponsored by the party, and has been educated up to at least the school certificate level or its equivalent, at the time of the election, is completely and totally eligible and qualified to contest the election; prima facie, by the provisions of Section 177 of. the Constitution.

The plain import and implication of the provisions of Section 177(a) is that a citizen of Nigeria by birth at the time of an election to the office of Governor of a State in Nigeria, remains qualified to contest the election by virtue of his birth as a citizen of Nigeria at the time of his birth.

This is a settled and established position, about which there can be no plausible doubt.

The next section under the issue is Section 182(1) (a), which, like Section 177. (a), is also clear, plain and unambiguous in the words employed by the legislature in their enactment to be entitled to be ascribed ordinary, liberal and purposeful meaning, in the context in which it was provided.

As seen, the provisions expressly stipulate and prescribe situations, circumstances and instances when and in which “No person shall be qualified for election to the office of Governor of a State if:-

(a) Subject to the provisions of Section 28 of this Constitution, he has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a country other than Nigeria or, except in such cases as may be prescribed by the National Assembly, he has made a declaration of allegiance to such other country.”

Clearly, the purport of the provisions in Section 182(1) (a) is that, subject to the provisions of Section 28 of the same Constitution, no person who has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a country other than Nigeria and except in such cases as may be prescribed by the National Assembly, he has made a declaration of allegiance to such other country, is or to be qualified for election to the office of Governor of a State in Nigeria.

Legally, for being made subject to the provisions of Section 28 of the Constitution, the provisions of Section 182(I) (a) are made to apply within the province and context of Section 28 to which they are made liable, subordinate, inferior, subservient and subject to for the purpose of the disqualification provided therein. Although, separate and independent provisions of the Constitution are, ordinarily, considered of the same equal status, efficacy and potency in interpretation and application, see INEC v. Musa (2003) FWLR (pt. 145) 729 (SC), where the provisions of a section of the Constitution is made “subject to” the provisions of another or other section of the same Constitution, the later provision prevail over and override the earlier provisions made subject or subjected to it. Put another way, the  provisions of a Section of the Constitution (or any other statute) made subject to the provisions of another section is only applicable as may be allowed, permitted or can be accommodated within the provisions of the section to which it is made subject to. Such subordinated and inferior section made subject to another section does not apply and is inapplicable independently of the provisions to which it is made subject to or subjugated to. This was the position stated by this court in FRN v. Osahon (2006) 2 SCIN, 348, (2006) LPELR – 3174 (SC) at page 63 – 64 per Onnoghen, JSC, that:-

“The expression “subject to” when used in a statute means liable, subordinate, subservient, or inferior to, governed or affected by; provided that or provided; answerable for. The term introduces a condition, a restriction, a limitation, a provision. It subordinates the provisions of the subject section to the section empowered by reference thereto and which is intended not to be diminished by the subject section. The expression generally implies that what is subject to shall govern, control and prevail over what follows in that subject section of the enactment, so that is renders the provisions to which it is subject conditional upon compliance with or adherence to what is prescribed in the provisions to which is subject conditional upon compliance with or adherence to what is prescribed in the provision referred to.”
See in addition, NDIC v. Okem Ent. Ltd. (2004). 4 SC (pt. II) 77, Ebhota v. P.I.P.D.C. Ltd. (2005), 7 SC (pt. III) 8, Idehen v. Idehen (1991) 6 NWIR (pt. 198) 382 (SC), Olagboyega v. Amibire (2013) All FWLR (pt. 684) 193, Iskwa v. Ibi (2017) 10 NWLR (pt. 1574) 343.

In these premises, the provisions of Section 182(1) (a) is to be interpreted in line and conformity with the provisions of Section 28 to which they are made subject to and which regulate and govern them in application.
For the purpose of Section 182(1) (a), Section 28 is the principal provision within and in the context of which it is to be interpreted and applied. Section 28 of the Constitution to which Section 182(1) (2) is made subject to, as seen above, simply says, in sub-section (1) that, a * person who is not citizen of Nigeria by birth, but who acquires or retains the citizenship or nationality of a country, other than Nigeria, which he is not a citizen of by birth, is not to forfeit his Nigerian citizenship on that ground or for that reason alone.

In sub-section (2), the provisions are that a person who is a citizen of Nigeria other than by birth, but by registration or the grant of a certificate of naturalization, but acquires or retains the citizenship of a country other than Nigeria to which he is not a citizen by birth, the registration or grant of certificate of naturalization, as the case may be, is to effective, only, upon effective renunciation of the citizenship or nationality of that other country within a period of not more than twelve months from the date of the registration or grant of certificate of naturalization as a citizen of Nigeria. The essence of Section 28(1) is to preserve the Nigerian citizenship of a person who is not a citizen: of Nigeria by birth, but who acquires or retains the citizenship of a country of which he is not a citizen of Nigeria other than by birth, from acquiring the citizenship of another country other than Nigeria by registration or grant from that other country while still holding or retaining the Nigerian citizenship. It prescribes that the registration or grant of certificate of Nigerian citizenship to a person who is a citizen of another country other than by birth, shali only be effective if the person renounces the acquired citizenship of that other country not more than twelve (12) from or after the date of the registration or grant of certificate naturalization as a Nigerian citizen. Put shortly, a person is prevented from acquiring and simultaneously retaining the citizenship to Nigeria and another country other than by birth (double citizenships) at the same time, not more that twelve (12) months after
acquiring the Nigerian citizenship.

It is beyond reasonable argument that the provisions of Section 28 deals with and provide for a person who is not a citizen of Nigeria by.

birth, as provided for in sub-section (1) when it states “not being a citizen of Nigeria by birth,” and in sub-section (2) which provides that
“any registration of a person as a citizen of Nigeria or the grant of a certificate of naturalization to a person is the citizen of a country other than Nigeria at the time of such registration or grant.”
A person who is a citizen of Nigeria by birth is therefore clearly and undoubtedly, not the subject of and is not within the purview, contemplation or the context of the provisions of Section 28 of the Constitution which controls, regulates and governs the application of the provisions of Section 182(1)(a) which are made subject to it. A citizen of Nigeria by birth as defined and provided for in Section 25(1) of the Constitution automatically acquires his citizenship as a birth right and needs no registration or naturalization for that status to be acquired by him or to be conferred on him as prescribed under Sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution. Section 28 deals with persons who are not citizens of Nigeria by birth and the provisions of Section •

182(1) (a) apply to and applicable to such Nigerians who are citizens other than by birth.
The position would have been different if the provisions of section 182(1) (a) of the Constitution were not made subject to or subordinated to the provisions of Section 28 in application.

The law remains that the duty of the court is to interprete and apply clear and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution or any statute, . as they are, and not as they ought to be so long as no absurdity would result. The court lacks the vires to import into of export out of the words of provisions of the Constitution or statute in order to suit particular facts of a case. See Tukur v. Govt. of Gongola State (1989) 1 SCNJ, 1, (1989) 2 NWLR (pt. 117) 517 at 547, Kotoye v. Sarah (1994) 7 – 8 SCNJ (pt. III) 524 at 545, (1994) 7 NWLR (pt. 357) 414, Gafar v. Govt. of Kwara State (2007) 1- 2 SC, 89, 2007) 4 NWLR (pt. 1024) 375, Anobi v. Nzegwu, (2013) LPELR -2863 (SC), Coca-Cola v. Akinsanya (2017) 8 (pt. 1567) 167 at 224-225 (SC), Obijiako v. Obijiako (2022) 17 NWLR (pt. 1859) 377 at 402 (SC).

By now, it must be clear that the provisions of Section which are subject to the provisions of Section 28, as they are, do not apply and  are not applicable to a person who is a citizen of Nigeria by birth, even if or when he voluntarily acquires and retains the citizenship of another country other than Nigeria at the same time he retains his Nigerian citizenship.

There is no provision in the Constitution which strips, takes away or removes the citizenship of by birth, from and a Nigerian on ground of the acquisition of the citizenship or another country other than Nigeria. Dual citizenship of a Nigerian by birth and of another country by registration or naturalization, etc., is not renunciation of Nigerian citizenship by a person as prescribed and provided for in Section 29 of the Constitution, so as to constitute a disqualification to contest for the office of. Governor of a State under Section 182(1) (a):

The Appellant has strenuously argued that the 31d Respondent has/had renounced his Nigerian citizenship by registration or naturalization as
a citizen of the USA by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to that country without any credible evidence of the renunciation as
stipulated in Section 29 which did not leave it totally at the discretion of the 3″ Respondent. The section provides that:-

（2） Any citizen of Nigeria of full age who wishes to renounce his Nigerian citizenship shall make a declaration in the prescribed manner for the renunciation.
the President shall cause the declaration made under subsection (I) of this section to be registered and upon
(3) such registration, the person who made the declaration shall cease to be a citizen of Nigeria.
The President may withhold the registration of any declaration made under subsection (1) of this section if-
(a) the declaration is made during any war, in which Nigeria is physically involved; or
(b) in his opinion, it is otherwise contrary to public policy.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section
• “full age” means the age eighteen years and above;
• any woman who is married shall be deemed to be of full age.”
Clearly by these provisions, renunciation of Nigerian citizenship must be made “in the prescribed manner” and caused to be registered by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, who has the discretion to withhold the registration, for inter alia, being contrary to public policy. For that reason, the only credible evidence to prove valid renunciation of citizenship by a Nigerian citizen by birth, such as the 3″ Respondent, is the registered renunciation in the prescribed manner as prescribed in Section 29 of the Constitution.

Apart from the bare assertion of the renunciation of the 3rd Respondent’s citizenship by birth, the Appellant did not even attempt to adduce any credible evidence which meets the requirements in Section 29 of the Constitution in order to discharge the burden of
proof placed and imposed on him by the law pursuant to the provisions of Sections 131, 132 and 133 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011. See Orji v. Dorji Text Mills Nig. Ltd. (2010) All FWLR (pt. 519) 999 (SC), Maihaja v. Gaidam (2018) 4 NWLR (pt. 1610) 454 at 502 (SC), Isa v. APC (2023) LPELR -60150 (SC). In the absence of such vital evidence, the assertion remains barren and bound to fail for lack or want of proof required by the law. See Bamgboye v. Olanrewaju (1991) 3 LRCN, 897 (SC), Odunsi v. Bamgbala (1995) 1 SCNJ, 275 at 288, Alh. Otaru v. Idris (1999) 6 NWLR (pt. 606) 330 (SC), Okeke v. Aondoakaa (2000)9 NWLR (pt. 673) 501 at 525 – 526, Ucha v. Elechi (2012) LPRLR – 7823 (SC).

This position of law is strengthened by the nature of the reliefs sought by the Appellant which are declaratory and entirely predicated on the allegation or assertion of renunciation of the 3″ Respondent’s citizenship by birth which the law requires the Appellant to prove his entitlement to them, satisfactorily, by credible and sufficient evidence and cannot in’so doing, rely either on alleged admission by the 3rd Respondent, failure to join issues in pleadings or weakness of the Respondents’ case. See Ucha v. Elechi (supra), also reported in
(2012) 13 NWLR (pt. 1317) 330 at 365 (SC), INEC v. Atuma (2013) 11 NWLR (pt. 1366) 494 at 521 (SC).

Mere subscription to the oath of allegiance to another country alone and without more, does not constitute or amount to renunciation of the Nigerian citizenship by birth without compliance with the provisions of Section 29 of the Constitution.

The court below is on the firm footing of the above position, when it held at pages 45 – 46 of the judgment appealed against pages 3304 – 3305 of vol. 6 of the Record of Appeal).

 

“Under Section 28(1) of the constitution, citizenship is lost if he acquired the citizenship of another country particularly if the person is not a citizen by birth of that country. Section 182(1) states that no person shall be qualified for the office of Governor of a State if he has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a country other than Nigeria or he has made declaration of allegiance to such other country.

Clearly said, the above requires the production of documentary evidence coupled with oral evidence to establish. It cannot be established by mere opinion or figment of imagination. The Appellant must produce documents to establish acquisition of the citizenship of another country or has made a declaration of allegiance to such other country.

The above evidence is lacking in the appellants case at the Tribunal. Hence, the Tribunal held that  there was dearth of evidence upon which the petitioner could establish his case.

 

 Section 28(1) of the Constitution  reveals that ever a citizen of Nigeria by Naturalization or Registration  does not lose his citizenship by adoption of the citizenship of his country of birth.
The corollary of this is that the citizen of Nigeria by  naturalization or birth never loses his citizenship even where he holds dual citizenship of another country and therefore, cannot be disqualified from contesting election to the office of the Governor of a State. See case of Labour Party is. Otakunte Ishola (supra), Dele Gboluga at Hon. Albert Akintoye & Ors. (supra) and Ogbeide v. Osula (2004) 12 NWLR (pt. 886) 86 at 127,” .

It may be recalled that the parties, the Appellant in particular, are one on the fact that both the 2nd and 3rd Respondents are citizens of Nigeria by birth and so to whom the provisions of Sections 28 and 182(1) (a) do not apply and are not applicable, as stated earlier. The fact; even if proved as required by the. law, as contended by the Appellant that the 3″ Respondent, ‘indeed, acquired and retained the citizenship of the USA either by registration or naturalization as a citizen of Nigeria by birth at the time of the time of election in question, he remained qualified by virtue of Section 177 (a) of the Constitution and was not disqualified under the provisions of Section 182(1) a), which, once more, are not applicable to him.

The above decision by the court below is therefore rooted in the correct position of the law and is unassailable.
The above being the position, it becomes manifest that the 3rdRespondent was not, at the time of the election, disqualified under the combined provisions of Sections 182(1) (a) and 187 (1) and (2) of the Constitution to have in turn, rendered the 2nd disqualified to contest the said election.

Section 187 (1) simply prescribes and requires the 2nd Respondent to nominate a Deputy Governorship candidate for his own nomination as the Governorship candidate to be deemed valid. It was in fulfilment • of the requirement that the 2″d Respondent nominated the 3rd Respondent for the election and the Appellant did not challenge or question the two nominations for obvious lack of locus standi to have
successfully done so.

In addition, the 3d Respondent has been demonstrated not to have been and is not affected by the disqualification in Sections 182 (1) (a) and Section 187 (2), having been validly nominated by the 2″c Respondent for the election under Section 187 (1).

This finding and conclusion on the issue has rendered the other sundry points raised by the Appellant under the issue such as expunging the evidence of PW7, PWS and PW9, on the basis of which the court is invited to depart from its decision in Obi v. INEC (supra), etc, idle and spent having been totally and effectively – subsumed in the decision on the foundation of the sole ground of the Appellant’s petition, this court being thé supreme and final appellate court in the country. The need and duty to consider such points on the merit, abate since the foundation has collapsed under them.

In the final result, the appeal is bereft of merit and it is dismissed in its entirely.
Consequently, the decision of the court below delivered on the 15th November, 2023 is affirmed in totality with an order that the parties shall bear their respective costs of prosecuting the appeal.

MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA
JUSTICE SUPREME COURT

APPEARANCE
Prof. A. Amuda-Kannike, SAN with D. D. Fiderikumo, Esq. and A.
O. Yusuf, Esq. for the Appellant.

K. O. Balogun, Esq. for the 1″ Respondent.
B. Afilola, Esq. and O. O. Agbaje, Esq. for the 2′ Respondent.
A. Mohammed, Esq. for the 3″ Respondent.