IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
12′ DAY OF JANUARY, 2024
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS
JOHN INYANG OKORO
UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA
ADAMU JAURO
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM
JUSTICE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA
JUSTICE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA
JUSTICE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA
JUSTICE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA
JUSTICE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA
- BADEBO PATRICK RHODES-VIVIOUR
AND
- INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC)
- BABAJIDE OLUSOLA SANWO-OLU
- DR. KADIRI OBAFEMI HAMZAT
- ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS (APC)
APPELLANT
RESPONDENT
SC/CV/1152/2023
JUDGMENT
(Delivered by John Inyang Okoro JSC)
I had the advantage of reading, in draft, the leading judgment of my learned brother, Mohammed Lawal Garba, JSC, just delivered. I entirely agree with His Lordship as to the outcome of this appeal.
In the instant appeal, the over-arching issue before this Court is whether the court below was right in holding that the second respondent has the right to be elected as Executive Governor of Lagos State, notwithstanding the third respondent’s purported disqualification.
The argument which was put forward by the appellant is that the court below was wrong to have upheld the decisions of the trial Tribunal which held, inter alla, that since the third respondent is a citizen of Nigeria by birth, his subscription to an oath or declaration of allegiance to the United States of America cannot and does not strip him of his citizenship, and that the appellant had failed to produce the Oath of allegiance or any other document in order to prove that the third respondent had renounced his Nigerian citizenship.
He further contended. that the disqualifying requirements under Section 182(1) (a) relates to two categories of citizens: (i) a citizen by birth who acquires the citizenship of another country; and (il) a citizen by bith who makes a declaration of allegiance to another country. Therefore, he posited, that citizenship by birth was not an immunity to the disqualifying factors under Section 182 (1) (a) of the Constitution.
By virtue of Section 28 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered), a person shall forfeit forthwith his Nigerian citizenship if, not being a citizen by birth, he acquires or retains the citizenship or nationality of a country, other than Nigeria, of which he is not a citizen by birth. It then follows that, a person who holds a Nigerian citizenship by birth cannot be deprived of his rights and privileges as a Nigerian citizen merely because he acquires or retains the citizenship of another country.
One of the rights and privileges of a citizen of Nigeria by birth, is the qualification for election to the office of Governor of a State, same being unambiguous expressed under Section 177 (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered). Thus, that a person is a Nigerian citizen by birth and is also a citizen of a foreign country, does not by itself disqualify him from contesting election to the office of Governor of a state in the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
It should also be pointed out that the disqualifying factors under Section 182 (1) (a) are made subject to Section 28. By the rules of construction generalia specialibus non derogant, when a provision in a statute is made subject to another provision, that provision must be read subordinate to the provision it is made subject to See: SPDCN Ltd. v. Agbara [2016] 2 NWLR (Pt 1496) 353; Matari v. Dangaladima [1993] 3 NWLR (Pt 281) 266, 279; Idehen v. Idehen [1991] 6 NWLR (Pt 198) 382, 411. If the drafters of the grand norm had intended the interpretation of Section 182 (1) (a) as canvassed by the – appellant, they wouldn’t have made it “subject to” Section 28 of the Constitution. The linking words “subject to Section 28”, indicates that Section 28 is to take priority over Section 177 (1) (a) containing the back reference.
Furthermore, the ordinary rules of construction of statutes dictate that the reading of the related provisions of the statute together, as well. as reading the whole Statute enables arriving at a construction of the objectives of the statute, the related sections and the intention of the law maker, Odutola Holdings Ltd. v. Ladejobi [2006] 12 NWLR (Pt 994) 321; Matari v. Dangaladima (supra).
My Lords, it is a notorious fact that many Nigerians have acquired foreign citizenships, and many others are constantly in the process of seeking such status. If they choose to acquire such status from a distant, friendly,. accommodating country, it does not, and I dare say, should not deprive anyone with an overwhelming sense of national duty and commitment to contributing-to national development, all noble principles, the right to contest elections and represent their constituencies in various positions. This should be so, unless, as provided under Section 29 of the Constitution, there is a declaration in the prescribed manner, a renunciation of citizenship by birth and registration of same under subsection (2).
The requirement of a declaration and registration of renunciation of citizenship in the prescribed manner is a constitutional requirement and, it did not constitute judicial legislation for the court below to require a proof of renunciation of the Nigerian citizenship of the third respondent, which the appellant could. Accordingly, it is not the owing of allegiance to the United States of America by virtue of being a citizen of that country that is a ground for disqualification from the office of Governor or Deputy Governor. It is rather, the renunciation of citizenship by a Nigerian citizen by birth that would be a sufficient ground for disqualification of the third respondent which was not proved at the courts below.
For the above reasons, I concur with my learned brother and hold that this appeal, being devoid of merit, be dismissed. The judgment of lower court is hereby affirmed. I also abide by the order as to costs in the leading judgment.
JOHN INYANG OKORO
JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL:
Prof. A. Amuda-Kannike, SAN, with D. D. Fiderikumo, Esq., and A. O. Yusuf, Esq., for the appellant.
K. O. Balogun, Esq., for the first respondent.
B. Afilola, Esq., and O. O. Agbaje, Esq., for the second respondent.
A. Mohammed, Esq., for the third respondent.



