JUDGEMENT DELIVERED BY CHIDIEBERE NWAOMA UWA, JSC-    SC/CR/842/2020

This is an appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal (Court below) sitting in the Kano Division (Coram: A.D. Yahaya, H.O. Abiru and A.A Wambai, JJCA.,) delivered on the 22nd September, 2020 affirming the conviction and sentence of the Respondent by the High Court of Justice, Jigawa State presided over by Hon. Justice Ado Yusuf Birnin Kudu delivered on 14th February, 2019 in suit No. JDU/03c/2017.

 The facts that led to this appeal are that the appellant, as 3rd defendant, was arraigned before High Court of Jigawa State, with two other defendants for offences of Conspiracy, Armed Robbery and Culpable Homicide. In the course of the trial, the prosecution called two witnesses and like the other defendants, the appellants testified in his defence and called no other witness. At the end of the trial, the Appellant and the other two defendants were each convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 14 years for the offence of Conspiracy, 21 years for Armed Robbery and to death for the offence of Culpable Homicide.

Dissatisfied with the judgement of the trial Court, the Appellant appealed to the Court below which affirmed the decision of the trial Court. The Appellant being dissatisfied with the decision of the Court below appealed to this Court via an Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 7/3/24 but, deemed properly filed and served on 28/3/2024. The Appellant’s Amended brief of argument was filed on 7/03/2024 but, deemed properly filed and served on 28/3/2024. In the said Appellant’s Amended brief of argument settled by A.S. Gadanya, two issues were formulated for determination thus:

1. Whether the lower Court was right in affirming the decision of the trial Court that the Respondent has proved the necessary ingredients of the offence of Culpable Homicide punishable with death, against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt. (Distilled from Grounds 2,4,6 and 8 of the Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal)
2. Whether the lower Court was right in affirming the decision of the trial Court that the Respondent has proved the necessary ingredients of the offence of Armed Robbery and Criminal Conspiracy against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt (Distilled from 1,3,5 and 7 of the Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal)

Arguing issue one, the learned counsel to the Appellant restated the ingredients of the offence of Culpable Homicide to be:

1. That the deceased had died;
2. That the death of the deceased had resulted from the act of the accused person;
3. That the act of omission of the accused which caused the death of the deceased was intentional with the knowledge that the death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence. See HABIBU USMAN V. STATE (2014) ALL FWLR (PT.713) PG. 1917.

It was argued that the prosecution in a criminal trial has an unshifting burden to prove the guilt of a defendant beyond reasonable doubt before a conviction can be sustained in line with the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence. See EGWUMI V. STATE (2013) ALL FWLR (PT. 678) PG. 824 and SECTION 138, EVIDENCE ACT 2011. It was further submitted that all the ingredients of the offence must be proved or co-exist before a conviction could be secured. See OCHIBA V. STATE (2012) AL FWLR (PT. 608) 849.

It was contended that the finding of the court below at page 135 of the printed record of Appeal that “it is clear from the the offensive weapons used, the injuries inflicted on the deceased, the appellant and his co-accused intended to cause death of the deceased or knew that death would be the probable consequence of their acts”(in italics) has no support from the evidence adduced before the trial court. It was further submitted that the only evidence of the death of the deceased is the PW1 that he died and was buried. The learned counsel insisted that no specific evidence or media report was tendered before the trial court and that no other member of the community testified as to the death of the deceased. Still on the death of the deceased, it was argued that “stronger evidence” ought to have been led before the trial Court showing that the deceased died.

On the second ingredient of Culpable Homicide, the learned counsel submitted that the finding of the court below at pages 134-135 of the records that the finding of the trial court that it was the defendants who robbed the PW1 and her husband was not hasty, is perverse and occasioned a miscarriage of justice against the Appellant. It was argued that the court below did not re-evaluate the evidence of the PW2 with a view of arriving at a just decision. Learned counsel relied on ACHILIHU V. ANYATONWU (2013) ALL FWLR (PT. 696) PG. 483. It was further submitted that the deceased who did not die on the spot, was taken to two different hospitals and died the after and there was no evidence showing the condition of the deceased and the medication administered in the two hospitals. It was conceded that where a deceased dies on the spot after an attack, cause of death could be inferred and medical evidence dispensed with. The learned counsel relied on UGURU V. STATE ( 2002) FWLR (PT. 103) PG. 330 and argued that the sort of evidence needed in the case is such that that ought to be supported medically which will indicate that the deceased died from injuries following the attack. It was maintained that the finding which was affirmed by the court below is perverse and has occasioned miscarriage of justice against the Appellant.

The learned counsel to the Appellant further contended that the extra-judicial statements of the Appellant was not tendered before the trial court as required, in that all vital and relevant evidence must be provided by the prosecution in trial court. It was argued that the circumstances of the death must point unequivocally to the Appellant as mere suspicion is insufficient, reliance was placed on CHUKWU V. STATE (2013) ALL FWLR (PT. 666) PG. 425 and AMAYO V. STATE (2001) 18 NWLR ( PT. 745) PG. 251). It was submitted that following the finding of the lower court at page 152 of the printed records that the trial court’s finding was based on inference and that it is circumstantially inferred that the deceased died as a result of the acts of the Appellant, the nature of circumstantial evidence must be cogent, positive, irresistible and conclusively point to no other person but the Appellant. Further, that the third ingredient of the offence of Culpable Homicide punishable with death has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the Respondent against the Appellant before the trial court, the Court below was therefore not justified in affirming the perverse decision of the trial court.

On issue two, the learned counsel to the Appellant submitted that all the ingredients of the offence of Armed Robbery must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and this entails the prosecution producing enough evidence to justify the charge. It was submitted that the Respondent must establish the following:

1. There was robbery;
2. It was carried out with the use of offensive weapons, and
3. The accused person participated in the robbery. See OGUDU V. STATE (2012) ALL FWLR (PT.629) PG. 111 AT 1131 PARA D, ADEKAJA VS. STATE (2013) ALL FWLR (662) P. 1632 AT 1651, A-B.

On the first ingredient, it was contended that the PW1, who was the only eye witness did not identify the Appellant among the gang that attacked her and the only circumstantial evidence primarily relied upon by the Court below is the evidence of the PW2 who was first informed on the phone and had no clue as to the involvement of the Appellant which, according to the learned counsel is rooted in suspicion and assumption. We were urged to hold that such cannot sustain a conviction.

On the second ingredient, it was argued that no weapon was recovered from the Appellant and the other defendants and the evidence on record is that the robbers did not use the guns allegedly held by them but used lighter weapons such as a lighter and nylon. We were urged to hold that there were doubts in the case of the Respondent at the trial Court, reliance was placed on ODOGWU V. STATE (2014) ALL FWLR (PT.719) PG. 1038).

On the third ingredient of Armed Robbery, it was argued that the Appellant was not identified by an eye witness at the trial Court and that evidence so led must be treated with caution such that any real weakness discovered is resolved in favour of the Appellant. See PIUS V. STATE (2016) 9 NWLR (PT. 1517) 341, SALE V. STATE (2016) NWLR (PT. 1499) PG. 392 and NDIDI V. STATE (2007) 13 NWLR (PT. 1052) PG. 633. It was submitted that the Court below was in manifest error when it upheld the decision of the trial court which relied on circumstantial evidence on the third ingredient of the charge of armed robbery without re-evaluating same. See NGUMA V. ATTORNEY GENERAL, IMO STATE (2014) 7 NWLR (PT. 1405) PG. 119.

On the offence of criminal conspiracy, the learned counsel argued that the finding of the Court below at pages 155-156 of the records of appeal is not supported by the evidence on record as findings hinged on circumstantial evidence must be consistent, cogent, compelling and irresistibly lead to the guilt of the Appellant. See ADELEKE V. STATE (2014) ALL FWLR (PT. 722) PG. 1652.

It was conceded that in an  appeal against concurrent findings of the Court below and the trial Court, the Appellant must show that the two decisions did not arise from the evidence on record and that in arriving at their decisions, the two courts have taken into account extraneous matters and that the courts did so on the basis of wrong inferences. See NWOKEARU V. STATE (2013) ALL FWLR (PT.689) PG. 1040. It was contended that the Appellant has been able to show the above listed conditions and we were urged to resolve this issue in favor of the Appellant, hold that the decision of the Court below is perverse and occasioned a miscarriage of justice, set aside the decision of the Court below affirming the conviction and sentence of the trial Court, discharge and acquit the Appellant.

 

In response, the Respondent’s brief which was settled by Muneer Musdapha Esq., formulated a sole issue for determination as follows:

Whether the learned justices of the Lower Court were right in affirming the Judgement of the Trial Court, including its evaluation of evidence, findings, convictions, and sentencing of the Appellant for the commission of the offenses of criminal conspiracy, armed robbery, and culpable homicide?”

It was submitted that the Court below was right to have upheld the evaluation of evidence by the trial court and affirmed the conviction and sentence of the Appellant. Further, the ingredients required in a charge of culpable homicide were established in evidence by the Respondent at the trial Court through the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution.

It was further submitted that the death of the deceased having been sufficiently established by the evidence of the PW1, there was no need for a medical report. See OGBU V. STATE (2007) 5 NWLR (PT. 1028) PAGES 666-667. It was argued that where a person is hit with a weapon and death is instantaneous or nearly so, a court can infer death, reliance was placed on EDOHO V. STATE (2010) 42 NSOR 451 and BAKORI V. STATE (1980) 8-11 SC 81. It was contended that the deceased in this case died on the same day he was beaten with sticks and nylon fireballs were placed on him, cause of death is clearly inferable.

On the second ingredient of culpable homicide, it was submitted that the act of the Appellant and the other assailants caused the gruesome death of the deceased.

It was contended on the third ingredient that the act of setting nylon on fire and dropping it on the body of a human being is capable of causing death or grievous bodily harm. We were urged to hold that the failure of the prosecution to tender the extra-judicial statements of the Appellant goes to no issue at all as the law does not impose any duty on the prosecution to call a host of witnesses to prove its case. See KWEME V. STATE (2022) 13 NWLR (PT. 1847) 273, AFOLALU V. STATE (2010) 16 NWLR (PT. 1220) 584, THEOPHILUS V. STATE (1996) 1 NWLR (PT. 423) 139 and ITU V. STATE (2016) 5 NWLR (PT. 1506) 443.

On the offence of the Armed Robbery, it was argued that all the elements of the offence were established by the Respondent particularly through the eye-witness evidence of the PW1 and that the direct, cogent and unequivocal evidence of the PW2 proved that the Appellant was one of the robbers, reliance was placed on BABAWURO USMAN V. STATE (2014) 5 SCNJ 353 AT 372 and EBECHI V. STATE (2009) 6 NWLR (PT. 1138) 431.

The learned counsel insisted that the Appellant and the other attackers had the opportunity of hiding or destroying the weapon used in committing the robbery, as such it is not a requirement of the law to produce the weapon of crime especially where there is overwhelming evidence that the Appellant took part in the robbery. We were urged to hold that the Court below was right when it affirmed the findings of the trial Court from the circumstantial evidence.

On the offence of Conspiracy, it was argued that the ingredients of the offence are usually inferred and proved through circumstantial evidence or where the defendants are found to have jointly committed the principal offence to which they are convicted. See ALARAPE V. STATE (2001) 5 NWLR (PT. 705) PG. 79. It was submitted that the Appellant, having been arrested while fleeing the scene of crime in company of the other attackers, they must have agreed and decided to do an act in concert with the same mindset, and this is evidence of conspiracy. We were urged to so hold and dismiss the appeal in its entirety.

The well-settled position of the law is that the prosecution bears the burden of proving the charge(s) against any defendant before a trial Court with credible evidence. In essence, the prosecution has a duty to adduce credible evidence to prove the ingredients of the offence (s) for which a defendant stands trial. This  burden does not shift until the prosecution has adduced credible and compelling evidence against the defendant by direct evidence otherwise known as eye-witness evidence, circumstantial evidence or confessional statement. See SECTION 135 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT, CHUKWUMA V FRN (2011) 13 NWLR (PT. 1264) 391 and ADELEKE V. STATE (2013) 16 NWLR (PT. 1381) 556 AT 572.

The Appellant’s grouse in this appeal is that the Court below was wrong to have affirmed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial Court did not properly evaluate the evidence before it and the Court below failed to re-evaluate the evidence on record. His argument majors on his non-participation in the crimes and lack of identification by any of the prosecution witnesses and that the Court below was hasty in its decision which affirmed the judgement of the trial Court as his conviction and sentence cannot be supported by the evidence adduced thereat.

Thus, the issue that calls for determination in this Appeal is whether the Court below was right to have affirmed the decision of the trial Court.

This entails the appraisal of the facts adduced in evidence vis-a-vis the ingredients of the offences with which the Appellant was charged.

The Appellant was charged with Conspiracy, Armed Robbery and Culpable Homicide. The ingredients required to ground conviction in these offences will be considered vis-a-vis the decision of the Court below which affirmed the decision of the trial Court, starting with the offence of Culpable Homicide. By Section 220 of the Penal Code, the offence of culpable homicide is committed where a person causes death:

(a) by doing an act with the intention of causing death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or

(b) by doing an act with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death; or

(c) by doing a rash or negligent act. See AHMED V. STATE (2001) LPELR-262(SC).

By the provision of Section 221 of the Penal Code, there are three ingredients which must be proved before one can secure conviction for the offence of Culpable Homicide, thus:

1. That the deceased died:
2. That his death was caused by the defendant;
3. That the defendant intended to either kill the victim or cause him grievous bodily harm. See SULE AHMED (ALIAS EZA) V. STATE (2001) 78 NWLR (PT. 745) 622 SC and ISAH V. STATTE (2017) LPELR-43472(SC).

Therefore, where a person is charged with an offence of culpable homicide as in the instant appeal, there would be an inquiry by the trial Court in the following sequence; whether the person alleged to be killed is dead, the cause of his death.

On the argument of the learned counsel to the Appellant that the prosecution failed to tender the medical report showing the death and cause of death of the deceased, it is not the law that where a medical report or certificate of death is not tendered, the death of a deceased is not established. The Court below noted at page 151 of the printed record of appeal on the first ingredient of Culpable Homicide as follows:

“The law is trite that a medical report is not necessary, to prove that a human being had died or its cause, in all cases. The evidence of PW1 was sufficient in proving that her husband died and has been buried. It is immaterial that no member of the community was called to say he died. It is also of no moment that PW1 was the wife of the deceased. Counsel for the Appellant did not elaborate on how PW1 is an interested party to what? Her husband was beaten in her presence and he sustained injuries. He was taken to the hospital where he died, she cannot give evidence of this firsthand experience? What caution was the trial judge expected to consider in receiving her evidence in the circumstances when she was also a victim. Is she going to fake the death of her husband?”

The Court below is right that the production of a medical report, where the cause of death can be inferred from circumstances, is not a necessity and failure of the prosecution in a trial to tender same is not fatal. In ADEKUNLE V. STATE (2006) 14 NWLR (PT. 1000) 717, (2006) LPELR-107(SC), MOHAMMED, JSC (as he then was) AT PAGE 15, PARAGRAPH B held as follows:

“To establish cause of death, the position of the law is that is that as much as medical evidence is desirable, it is clearly not a sine qua non as cause of death may be established by sufficient satisfactory and conclusive evidence other than medical evidence showing beyond reasonable doubt that the death of the deceased in question resulted from the particular act of the accused person.”

See also BEN V. STATE (2006) LPELR-770(SC). His lordship AKINTAN, JSC AT PAGE 12-13 PARAGRAPH F on the inessentiality of a medical report where evidence proves the death of the deceased held as follows:

“The position of the law in this respect had been stated in numerous cases. It is that in cases where a man was attacked with lethal weapon and he died on the spot, cause of death can be properly inferred that the wound inflicted caused the death. Put in another form, where the cause of death is obvious, medical evidence ceases to be of any practical or legal necessity in a homicide case. Such a situation arises where death was instantaneous or nearly so. See *ONWUMERE V. THE STATE (1991) 4 NWLR (PT. 186) 428 and NWACHUKWU V. THE STATE (2002) 12 NWLR (PT. 782) 543.”

The evidence of the PW1 at the trial Court is that after the robbers left, the deceased was rushed to Gumei General Hospital from where he was referred to Aminu Kano Teaching Hospital where he died the same day and was buried in accordance with Islamic injunctions. This piece of credible evidence from the wife of the deceased (PW1) who participated in all the steps taken all the way to the burial of the deceased was not challenged by the defence as no question was asked regarding this piece of evidence in the course of cross-examination. He has not been said to be or seen alive and has not been shown not to have died as stated by the PW1. There is no contrary evidence to the evidence of the PW1 that her husband died. I am at one with the decision of the Court below that the evidence of the PW1 was sufficient to establish the death of the deceased.

 

On the second ingredient, the evidence of the PW1 is that the deceased was not only attacked and beaten up by a gang of robbers, fire made from burning nylon was put on him and all efforts to keep him alive by rushing him to the hospital and being referred to a teaching hospital for better treatment proved abortive. Again, this piece of evidence was accepted, unshaken under cross examination and uncontradicted at the trial Court by the Appellant who posed no question whatsoever to the witness on the death of the deceased. No issue was made of the death or otherwise of the deceased at the trial Court. It is a lame argument from the Appellant, having failed to purposefully and effectively cross examined on the death of the deceased to now contend that the Respondent did not prove the death and cause of the deceased. There is simply no doubt that from the evidence on record that the deceased succumbed to the injuries inflicted upon him in the course of the attack. Again, for emphasis, where there is clear and sufficient evidence that the death of the deceased was the direct result of the unlawful act of the defendant to the exclusion of all other reasonable possible cause, the trial Court can infer the cause of death with or without a medical report. See MUHAMMED V. STATE (2017) LPELR-(42098)(SC) PP 23-26, PARAGRAPHS D-B, PER AUGIE JSC.

 

 In UGURU V. STATE (2002) LPELR-3325(SC) cited by the learned counsel to the Appellant, the deceased died about four days after the infliction of the injuries on him, according to the evidence. He was taken to two different hospitals within the four days but no evidence was called or given at the trial about the nature of the injuries he sustained or the treatment given in respect thereof or to prove the cause of his death. The evidence that the P.W.2 and P.W.3 saw the Appellant inflicting matchet blows on the deceased was adjudged not to be evidence of proof of what causes the death of the deceased, since his death took place four days thereafter. This is different from the instant case where the deceased died the same day the attackers beat him up and put fireballs on his body. In the said case, KALGO JSC at page 17 made the distinction as follows:

 “… Medical evidence is not essential in all cases to prove the cause of death. See Oguntolu case (supra) for example where a person was attacked and he or she dies immediately or so soon after the infliction of the injury on him or her, medical evidence is not necessary to prove the cause of the person’s death. The cause of death in that case is the injury inflicted on the person and the accused who inflicted the injury is guilty of the offence charged.”

 

Granted, in the case of OGUNTOLU V. STATE (1996) LPELR -2354(SC), the evidence was that the deceased died on the spot in the hands of the Appellant who then dragged the dead body to one side of the road and heaped rubbish on it. Medical evidence was deemed unnecessary in the circumstance. See also TOBI V. STATE (2019) LPELR -46537(SC) wherein learned counsel to the Appellant therein equally raised eyebrows on the failure of the Respondent to tender any medical report on the death of the deceased victim. His lordship, SANUSI, JSC at pages 10-14 held as follows:

“In the instant case, PW1, the wife of the deceased who witnessed the commission of the offence and was therefore an eye witness, testified that she saw when the appellant stabbed her husband at the back and his leg with a knife… These pieces of evidence therefore clearly shows that the deceased died not too long after the injuries were inflicted on him with the knife by the appellant. There was no evidence of any intervening factor that could have caused or aggravated his death. The death of the deceased could therefore be regarded as instantaneous since there has not been any break in the chain of causation that could be attributed to the death of the deceased besides the injuries inflicted on him by the appellant. In that circumstance, the non-tendering of a medical report by the prosecution cannot be regarded as fatal to its case at the trial Court…………………..

I this instant case, evidence abounds that the deceased died few hours after he was stabbed by the appellant and that piece of evidence was never challenged, controverted or contradicted at the trial.”

 

Where the death is instantaneous or soon thereafter as in this case, then medical evidence ceases to be a legal requirement. It can be dispensed with, evidence having shown that the victim died in circumstances which leaves no doubt as to the manner or as to the cause of the death of the deceased victim. The trial Court was right to have dispensed with it and the Court below rightly affirmed same. See ESSIEN V. STATE (1993) 6 NWLR (PT. 290) 303 and AKPA V. STATE (2008) 14 NWLR (PT. 106) 72.

 

 The question now is whether the Court below, was right to have affirmed the decision of the trial Court that the Appellant was one of the person’s that attacked the PW1 and the deceased? At page 152 of the printed record of appeal, the Court below held as follows:

“What caused the death which was nearly instantaneous, was clearly rightly inferred to be the acts of the Appellant and his co-accused persons. PW1 identified 1st and 2nd accused persons as those who beat them and inflicted the injuries. The Appellant has been linked to them and to his participation in the robbery.”

 At pages 133-135 of the records, the Court below held that in spite of the failure of the PW1 to identify the Appellant as one of those who attacked her, the decision of the trial Court that the Appellant was one of the robbers was not hasty in view of the evidence of the PW2 that the Appellant was one of the persons who were pursued and subsequently arrested. The learned counsel to the Appellant argued strenuously that this finding of the Court below at pages 134-135 of the record is perverse and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice against the Appellant, having not re-evaluated the evidence of the PW2.

 

 In his evidence at the trial Court, the PW2 stated on oath that he had known the Appellant before the incident and that after he was called by the Bulama Auwalu of Fagen Gawo that the deceased and his family had been robbed and that the robbers were on their way between Fagen Gawo and Danzomo, he mobilised two vehicles with some other persons and started following the motorcycle which the robbers rode. Further, the robbers were sighted by a bystander who pointed the PW2 towards the direction the robbers went and the pursuit continued until they entered a thick bush that the vehicles could not enter. They returned to Tundun Fulani where they had passed in the course of the chase and went to the house of the 1st defendant ( who had been identified on the motorcycle by the PW2 and other members of the community). The motorcycle that was stolen and ridden from the scene of crime was found in the house of 1st defendant where the Appellant was also found and arrested. The Appellant was caught up by the doctrine of recent possession when the stolen motorcycle taken away from the scene of crime was found in the house of the 1st defendant where the Appellant was found and arrested. He had no explanation as to how the motorcycle came to be in their possession. See, MUFUTAU AREMU & ANOR V. THE STATE (1991) LPELR -545(SC) PP. 29031, PARA F, I hold that the doctrine of recent possession applies to the Appellant.

 

 More importantly, the PW2 stated that he had known the Appellant before the incident, instantly recognizing him when he was seen on a motorcycle along with the other robbers fleeing the scene. Evidence of identification by recognition is the best evidence of identity of a defendant. I am in agreement with the Court below that the non-identification of the Appellant by the PW1 was immaterial in view of the link properly created between the Appellant and the other defendants and the offence at the trial Court by the evidence of the PW2. The learned Appellant’s Counsel argued that other witnesses ought to have been called to testify as to the death and burial of the deceased in view of the evidence of the PW1 stating that others were there. It is settled that the prosecution is not required to call a host of witnesses to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence of a single witness, if believed, is sufficient to ground a conviction. What is important is not the number but the quality of the evidence of the witness(es) called. Once the prosecution is able to produce credible and convincing evidence of the commission of the offence by the defendant beyond reasonable doubt, the onus is discharged. See ODUNLAMI V. THE NIGERIA ARMY (2013) 12 NWLR (PT.1367) 20; AYENI V. THE STATE (2016) LPELR – 40105 (SC) and SIMEON V. STATE (2018) LPELR – 44388 (SC). It was established with cogent evidence that the deceased was beaten and fireballs put on him which caused his death. It was equally established that the Appellant was one of the attackers who perpetrated the heinous act on the deceased. By joining others in putting fireballs on the body of the deceased and beating him with sticks, it is beyond contest that the Appellant intended to cause the deceased grievous bodily harm. It is the law that a person intends the natural consequences of his action and if there was an intention to cause grievous bodily harm and death results, then the defendant must be held culpable for the offence of culpable homicide. The lower Court was correct when it found that the Respondent led credible evidence to prove the third ingredient of culpable homicide. The ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide having been shown to have proved with credible evidence, there is no reason to alter the decision of the Court below affirming the decision of the trial Court on the conviction and sentence of the Appellant in respect of the offence of culpable homicide.

 On the offence of Armed Robbery, the ingredients are unchanged; the prosecution must establish the following:

1. That there was a robbery.
2. That the robbery was an armed robbery.
3. That the defendant was the armed robber or one of the armed robbers.

  The trial Court found that the Appellant, alongside two other defendants committed the offence of armed robbery. The trial Court held at page 53 of the record as follows:

“I have given the prosecution’s case a very careful and anxious consideration and I believe the testimonies of PW1 and PW2 in this case that there was a robbery or series of robberies in between hours of 02/07/2016 at Malamawa Gidan Maza, Garki Local Government Area of Jigawa State wherein a motorcycle belonging to one Maiunguwa Idi alias Namalamawa (now deceased) and mobile phones belonging to him and his wife (PW1) were robbed after they were put in fear of instant death or grievous hurt. On the second ingredient of the offence, it is clear from the evidence of PW1 that the accused persons used sticks in beating her and her husband, they also used lighter to set a nylon on fire and allow the drops of the fire balls to hut the back of the deceased and other parts of the body.

 

In the same vein, I have no doubt that it was the 1st, 2nd and 3rd accused persons that robbed PW1 and her late husband of their motorcycle and mobile phones on that fateful date…… these pieces of evidence was never shaken or contradicted, I therefore ascribe full probative value to it…… In view of the foregoing, I am satisfied that all the necessary ingredients required for the proof of the offence of robbery have been established beyond reasonable doubt and I so hold.”

 

These findings were confirmed on appeal by the Court below particularly with regard to the crucial evidence of identification of the Appellant as one of the participants in the robbery. The learned Counsel to the Appellant, while conceding that there was a robbery, argued that the Appellant was not identified among the gang that attacked the PW1 and the deceased. The Court below held as follows at page 145 of the record:

 

“On robbery, the prosecution led evidence through PW1 who testified that she and her husband were attacked on the fateful night, and their cell phones and a motorcycle belonging to her husband stolen. She also testified to the fact that the accused persons used sticks to beat them and also dropped nylon fire on the back of her deceased husband. She identified 1st and 2nd persons (sic) to be amongst the attackers. Her evidence was direct, positive. She was not discredited under cross examination. The trial judge believed her. PW2 also testified and stated that when he was contacted about the robbery, he immediately organized a search party and they pursued the robbers when they sighted them. He saw three people on a machine. The Appellant was shown to be amongst the three accused persons who ran away from the scene of the crime and who was arrested alongside the motorcycle that has just been stolen from the deceased, at the house of the 1st co-accused person, soon after the robbery and the other co-accused persons. These circumstances, point to only one inevitable conclusion, that he was one of the robbers. The evidence of PW2 was direct, cogent and unequivocal, pointing to the fact that there is no other reasonable explanation from that he was one of the robbers………. the trial Judge was therefore in order, when he made the finding, from the circumstantial evidence, that the Appellant participated in the robbery. He had this been properly identified and linked to the scene of the robbery.”

 

As noted earlier in this judgement, it was established in evidence that there was a robbery in the house of the PW1 and the deceased. It was also established that the robbers were armed and that the Appellant was sufficiently linked to the Armed Robbery and attack in the house of the PW1 and the deceased. This was sufficiently dealt with earlier in the judgement and the Court below was right to have affirmed the finding that the Appellant was involved in the robbery. I have no reason whatsoever to disagree with these concurrent findings of the two courts on the role of the Appellant in the commission of the offence. The Appellant herein has been unable to show how the concurrent findings of the two Courts were perverse, not based on available evidence or had occasioned a miscarriage of justice which are the only reasons for upsetting the concurrent findings of the two Courts by this Court. See AGUNSOYE V. AROJOJOYE (2023) LPELR-60393(SC).

 

 The armed robbery was orchestrated and carried out by the Appellant and the other defendants as found by the trial Court and affirmed by the Court below. I hold that the offence of armed robbery was proved beyond reasonable doubt by the Respondent and the conviction and sentence of the trial Court for the offence of armed robbery which was upheld by the Court below is hereby affirmed.

 

  On the offence of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and culpable homicide, the law requires the prosecution to prove the following:

(a) That there was an agreement between two or more persons to carry out some illegal act or do some legal act but by illegal means;

(b) Where the agreement is other than agreement to commit offence, that some acts besides the agreement was done by one or more of the parties in furtherance of the agreement;

(C) That each of the defendants participated in the conspiracy.

 

 The evidence accepted by the trial Court and affirmed by the Court below is that the Appellant and the other two defendants robbed the PW1 in her house on the 2/7/2016 while armed. As espoused earlier in this judgement, it is clear that the Appellants and his cohorts agreed to steal the deceased’s motorcycle and made away with it. It is equally in evidence that they causes the death of one Maiunguwa Idi who was beaten and grievously injured with fire. Conspiracy is the agreement by two or more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. See OMOTOLA & ORS V. STATE (2009) LPELR-2663(SC), STATE V SALAWU (2011) LPELR -8252 (SC) and LUCKY V. STATE (2024) LPELR -61783(SC). The evidence adduced at the trial Court by the prosecution clearly shows that there was a conspiracy between the Appellant and his co-defendants to commit the offences of Armed Robbery and Culpable Homicide and that the Appellant did participate in the commission of the said offences. All the elements of the offence of Conspiracy were established beyond reasonable doubt after an evaluation of evidence by the learned trial judge which was affirmed by the Court below. It has not been shown to be perverse, I align with the decision of the Court below affirming the conviction and sentence of the Appellant.

 

 In sum, the appeal is devoid of merit and it is hereby dismissed. The judgement of the Court below upholding the Appellant’s conviction and sentence on all three counts of Conspiracy, Armed Robbery and Culpable Homicide is hereby affirmed.

 

                              ……………..

CHIDIEBERE NWAOMA UWA

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

COUNSEL:

A.S. Gadanya Esq. with N.S Uthman Esq. for the Appellant.

Muneer Musdapha Esq. for the Respondent.